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ABSTRACT

The following essays in public choice are concerned with two main subjects:
changes in public educational quality due to competition from surrounding private
schools and the settings that foster increased interest group activity and what impact that
activity has on the relative economic development of US states. While these subjects
may seem varied, they are both important in understanding differences in economic
development.
Education has long been associated with economic expansion, so it is important to
understand the impacts that private markets for education have on its public provision. In
Chapter II, I look at whether there are competitive effects on public schools in California
due to the existence of surrounding private schools, and if these effects induce public
schools to provide a better education to students. If public institutions are prone to
respond to competitive pressures, there is a timing issue that may prevent immediate
improvements. Since public schools are likely to take time to respond to competitive
pressures, I use lagged private school enrollment as an explanatory variable for public
school test scores. My results indicate that public schools do respond to higher degrees of
competition from surrounding private schools, but that the effects are delayed.
The latter two chapters discuss topics under the special interest group theory of
government. This theory holds that special interest groups dissipate real resources in the
economy by paying for favorable legislation and transfers of wealth from the government
through lobbying. To demonstrate evidence for this theory, I first provide a study on the
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settings that foster interest group accumulation across US states. This study uses panel
data for US states over the time period 1990-2005 to explain those factors that lead to the
formation of interest groups.
The number of trade associations is used to proxy the number of interest groups
and my results show that population differences, socioeconomic development,
differences in the structure of legislature, government and industry, and public spending
are important factors in determining interest group formation. Additional evidence is
provided to measure the impact interest group activity has on economic development.
Several measures of economic development are used including the number of initial
public offerings (IPOs) per state.

I find that interest group activity through the

constitution and through the legislature have overall negative impacts on all measures of
development.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A wide array of research attempts to understand what makes some countries or
regions more economically wealthy than others. The following essays take a public
choice approach to this question and explore additional aspects that either aid or hinder
economic development. The topics explored are education, which has long been shown
to aid in the growth of economies, and interest groups, which are a more controversial
topic when it comes to their impact on wealth and development. Both topics also tie into
the question of how private markets, such as privately provided education or privately
funded interest groups, affect the ability of public institutions to function efficiently.
For example, the Chapter II outlines the impact private markets for education
have on the quality of publicly provided education.

Because public schools have

differing incentives from that of their private counter parts, one might imagine that public
schools would have little incentive to act competitively in the provision of education. Of
course both types of schools have in mind the goal of quality education for their students,
but private schools also have in mind the goal of cost effectiveness. Public schools on
the other hand may be more interested in budget maximization.
Schools that do not use the budget allotted to them typically lose some funding;
therefore, it may be in a public school’s best interest to find something to spend their
money on. Rather than the efficient allocation of resources that takes place within private
firms, it may choose to spend its budget on materials for those teachers who “lobby” the
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most for additional funds allocation. Or, it may choose to spend a technology ear-marked
budget on new technology that provides little marginal benefit over the old technology.
As an anecdotal example of this type of technology spending, each year during
the 1990s my parents’ family-owned computer business would submit a bid to provide
new computer technology to the local public schools. Bids were cast by other local
computer businesses, as well as national businesses, such as Dell Computers, Inc. For
many years my parents sold computers to the local public schools and were paid with
budgetary funds ear marked for technology spending. New computers were purchased
every year that were only marginally better than the computers purchased the previous
school year; however, if these funds were not spent they would not be re-allocated the
next school year.
Old computers were cycled down as protocol allowed to other government
projects with smaller budgets such as after-school and in-school suspension programs;
however, many times these year-old computers were hauled away to older, little-used
government buildings and were sold as government surplus by the pallet for next to
nothing. Even though these year-old computers were equally as functional as the newly
purchased computers for school labs, the budget was exhausted simply to retain the same
or better budgetary allocations the next year. Is it true that tax dollars spent in such a way
really improve the quality of education received by public school students?
A related question: Does competition from surrounding private schools induce
public schools to take actions to increase the quality of education provided and spend
their budgets more efficiently? It is the latter question that Chapter II attempts to address.
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The current literature has not yet come to a definitive answer regarding this issue;
however, no study to my knowledge has considered the possibility that public schools
may take a significant amount of time to react to such competition by making quality
increasing changes to public education. Chapter II investigates the possibility of a lagged
quality increase due to higher levels of competition from private schools.
The following two chapters discuss the settings that foster interest group
formation and what impact interest group activity has on economic development.
Chapter III focuses on the differences in interest group formation across US states and
what promotes these differences. Our government is seemingly more representative of
well-organized pressure groups rather than the general public. While there are laws in
place intended to prevent the “purchase” of legislation by any one citizen or group of
citizens, donations of campaign funds and promises of votes from large and/or wellfunded groups heavily influence the decisions of elected representatives.
This system of influence is merely a consequence of the benefit-maximizing
coordination between groups who can easily organize and obtain government favor, and
representatives who wish to obtain or keep their elected positions. The problem lies in
the negative impacts on those who remain less represented in the formulation of
Congressional decisions. Because a large portion of tax payers find it costly to organize
and lobby, they must produce the tax revenue used to provide subsidies to these wellorganized groups. They must also suffer any negative consequences of laws passed to
favor these groups, such as decreased competition, distortions that create economic
inefficiency and deadweight loss.
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It should be duly noted that these groups are not to blame in any way for such
gross inefficiency, nor are the politicians that help them succeed in obtaining government
favor. Again, they are all merely benefit maximizing actors responding to the political
system they face. It should also be noted that the response to this political system results
in rent-seeking, or the use of productive resources as investments for procuring transfers
of wealth. Chapter IV is meant to illustrate how using productive resources to procure
transfers rather than re-investing them in order to generate additional productive
resources has a negative impact on economic development.
In essence, interest groups use income generated through mutually beneficial
exchange as a means of convincing politicians to allocate transfers of wealth in their
direction. If this type of resource allocation were not an option, then those productive
resources would be invested back into the economy in the form of consumer spending,
investment or time spent producing goods and services. Instead, time and money are
spent to acquire wealth from those who lack the organization or influence to prevent
those transfers.
Many economists view this as an unproductive use of productive resources.1 If
this type of activity is truly unproductive and generates overall negative impacts on
economic surplus, then we should see less economic development where there is more
interest group activity. Chapter IV tests this theory empirically using measures of interest
group activity formulated in Chapter III. Given the recent economic downturn, it is
especially crucial to understand what fosters economic development and what hinders it.

1

See Chapter IV for a detailed review of literature on this subject.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE PRIVATE SCHOOL EFFECT ON PUBLIC STANDARDIZED TEST SCORES

I.

Introduction

Private schools offer a wider variety of instruction methods to choose from than
the average public school. If you prefer your child to be educated under a particular
religious view or if you prefer him or her to learn military-like self discipline, private
schools practically have it covered when it comes to the selection of educational products
available. This is good news for the parent willing to pay for these amenities, but do the
competitive instincts felt by private schools actually aid in providing a better education
for public school students?
When measuring the quality of educational product offered by public schools, test
scores remain the traditional method. This chapter addresses the question of what, if any,
effect a competitively behaving private school has on its public school neighbors. Are
low-income parents who would like to send their children to private schools, but cannot
afford it, benefited, harmed or unaffected by the private market for education? We know
the consumers paying for private school are happy with the product they are purchasing
as long as they continue to pay tuition. But, are low-income families experiencing any
positive or negative externalities from these private school transactions?
Because public and private schools provide substitutable educational goods, it
follows that there is some degree of competition between the two. The purpose of this
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study is to investigate this implied competition between public and private schools, to
provide some evidence of whether that competition is a source of externalities for
surrounding public schools, and how long it might be before changes take place at the
public level.
Higher degrees of competition from private schools could affect surrounding
public schools in several ways. Sorting may take place among the schools in that
students with specific qualities move away from public schools and into private schools,
changing the make-up of student populations. This change in student populations will
likely affect the average test scores of public schools. The change in enrollment and test
scores is somewhat indicative of a high degree of competition, which could induce public
schools to increase the quality of education they offer. My results suggest that there are
some positive externalities for public schools as a result of private markets for education;
however, it takes many years for public school students to benefit from them.
While this study offers evidence for a positive effect on public achievement in the
long-run, the short-run effect private schools have on their public counterparts is unclear.
One plausible explanation for the lagged adjustment in public school quality is that it
takes time for public schools to detect higher levels of competition as well as time to
respond by increasing the quality of education offered. So, the remaining public school
students benefit in the form of measures taken by the public school that lead to better test
scores. But, since these measures are not taken immediately and may vary in degree, test
scores in the short-run are unlikely to show perceptible changes in one direction for all
affected schools. Assuming that test scores are a legitimate measure of educational
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quality, I find that public school students get a better quality education in the long-run
due in part to the existence of a free market for education.
In the following section, a review of literature on the subject of competition
between these two types of schools is provided. Section III describes the empirical
specification used as well as supporting literature for this specification and Section IV
provides a detailed description of data and expected signs on the coefficients. Section V
discusses the estimation techniques used and the results produced with those techniques.
The final section provides concluding remarks and offers ideas for future research. All
summary statistics and estimation results are provided in Appendix A.

II.

Review of Literature

When public school students switch to private school, there could be a number of
reasons why. But, traditionally it is thought that switching mostly occurs because the
student is of high ability and is unchallenged in public school. If so, this would leave a
pool of low and high ability, low-income students left in the public school. Epple and
Romano formulated a theoretical model of this equilibrium in student populations among
public and private schools in the presence of a voucher system. 2
They allowed students to differ in abilities, where the high ability students have
increased educational success and provide a positive effect on the educational successes
of peers. They allowed households to differ by income and measured school quality by
2

Dennis Epple and Richard E. Romano, “Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and
Peer-Group Effects,” The American Economic Review 88, no. 1 (1998): 33-62.
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the mean ability of the student population. Each household is assumed to have one
student of ability, b, and household utility is a function of consumption and the
educational attainment of the student. In equilibrium, the authors found that student
types will be sorted by income and ability across tax-financed public schools and tuitionfinanced private schools.

The authors found a Pareto efficient outcome with the

existence of only private schools, which practice price discrimination among students. In
the private school equilibrium, high-ability, low-income students are subsidized by highincome students in the form of scholarships and tuition discounts. 3
Allowing for public provision of education in the model, a Pareto efficient
equilibrium no longer existed as public schools cannot price discriminate.

When

introducing a voucher system into the model, the authors found that as the size of the
school voucher increased, the mean ability in public schools decreased because of the
sorting of high ability students into private schools. One drawback of this model is that
public and private schools are assumed to provide a homogeneous level of education and
school quality depends only on the ability of its mean student. But, this does give some
theoretical basis for how students will be sorted among public and private schools as well
as information on how a voucher system might affect student populations in the face of
competition from private schools.4
Many economists have tackled the subject of public vs. private schooling and why
the two sometimes produce vastly different results. Some empirical evidence provided

3

Epple and Romano, “Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group
Effects,” 33-62.
4
ibid
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by Sander investigated the effects that attending a Catholic school has on the test scores
of non-Hispanic whites attending Catholic schools. He showed that for a particular data
cohort, 8 years in a Catholic grade school is associated with higher math, reading and
vocabulary scores, and that this result is not due to the selection of extraordinary students
by the Catholic schools. He claims that this “Catholic school effect” is due to nonCatholics who attend Catholic schools, which would suggest ability sorting among nonCatholic students as well as the positive “peer effects” shown in the Epple and Romano
model. 5
The empirical economic literature on the subject of competitive effects between
public and private schools has produced differing opinions on the subject. Some studies
find that there is no private market effect on public schools, or that the effect is washed
out by other factors. Other results have concluded that public schools actually do change
their behavior when faced with competition from private schools. Yet, I was unable to
find one that explored the possibility that public schools do not adjust to competition
immediately. All studies thus far have focused on the immediate effects of competition.
Sander went on to analyze the effect that private schools in Illinois have on
neighboring public school performance by looking at school-level data in 1996. In this
paper, he used county-level Catholic population densities as an instrumental variable for
the percentage of students in private school. Private school enrollment has been thought
to be endogenous to public school achievement since theory predicts that there will be a
greater demand for private schools where public school achievement does not meet
5

William Sander, “Catholic Grade Schools and Academic Achievement,” The Journal of Human
Resources 33 (1996): 540-548.

9

parental expectations. For his measure of public school achievement, he uses IGAP
(Illinois Goal Assessment Program) test scores. Accounting for many family, school and
community background factors, Sander concluded that there is no private school effect on
current test scores in public schools. He claimed that there may be two opposing effects
leading to a net effect of zero. First, the superior students may be leaving public school
for private school, decreasing the average student quality in public schools. This idea of
“cream-skimming” occurs when the smartest and most advantaged students leave public
schools for private ones. Second, the increase in competition from private schools may
be forcing the public schools to provide a better education. 6
Hoxby came to a very different conclusion. The advantage of her paper is
that she used county-level data across all the U.S. states to test the same effect, while
tackling the idea of cream-skimming. To measure the success of public schools, Hoxby
used the highest grade completed by age 24. She also recognized the possibility that
private school enrollment is endogenous to public school performance, so she used
Catholic population shares, densities and church densities as instrumental variables for
private enrollment. Holding other variables such as per-pupil spending in private and
public schools and teacher salary constant, she found that private school competition
lowers total public school spending. Also, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of
county secondary enrollment in Catholic schools increases public school students’
educational achievement by .33 years and wages by 2%. So, if the quality of education in
public schools is increasing because of competitive pressures, parents of public school
6

William Sander, “Private Schools and Public School Achievement,” The Journal of Human Resources
34 (1999): 697-709.
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students could be getting a better quality product for a lower price because of this
“market effect.” 7
She also included empirical work to show that these estimated improvements are
not due to the sorting, or cream-skimming, of students between public and private
schools. She accounted for the difference between changes in the student population and
changes in public school behavior by comparing coefficients on Catholic private school
enrollment. She reported estimated IV coefficients for enrollment in Catholic schools
using three different dependent variables: 1) highest grade completed by age 24, 2)
natural log of hourly wages, and 3) percentile score in the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test.8
She first included only public school students in these three dependent variable
measures when estimating the coefficients for Catholic school enrollment. She then
estimated the Catholic school enrollment coefficients again including both public and
private school students in the three dependent variable measures. She found that the
results when using only public school students were not significantly different from the
results that lump public and private students together. So, the coefficients on Catholic
school enrollment were not affected by the sorting of students. This suggests that there
are both low and high ability, low-income students benefiting from competition since not
all high ability students are sorted into private school.9

7

Caroline Minter Hoxby, “Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?,” National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4978, (1994).
8
ibid
9
ibid

11

She noted that if public schools respond to surrounding private school
competition, they will most likely raise quality and not reduce taxes to keep quality
constant. Reducing taxes would allow parents more income with which to spend on
private school tuition. She also showed that when parents have fewer public schools to
choose from, the expense of public schools within a school district as measured by tax
dollars spent per school increases. Parents who live in a particular school district may be
mandated to choose from public schools only within that district and there may be few, or
in some cases only one, public school to choose from. This increases enrollment in
private schools and decreases the educational attainment of those remaining in public
schools. These results provide some empirical evidence of the theoretical results of
Epple and Romano where increased enrollment in private schools decreases the student
quality of public schools.10
In addition, Hoxby showed evidence that teachers’ unions are stronger and more
prevalent in areas with weak competition among public schools. Weak competition
among public schools implies there are fewer choices of public schools for students in a
particular district, or in other words, when the switching costs from one public school to
another are high. If parents are mandated to send their children to particular public
schools based on school districts and there are few to choose from, the costs of switching
to public schools outside the district will include moving from one district to another.11

10
11

Hoxby, “Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?.”
ibid
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Several other authors have found conflicting results on the competitive effects
from private schools. Couch et al12, Dee13, Geller et al14, Maranto et al15, Newmark16,
Sass17, and Smith and Meier18 all used county-level data from various states to test this
effect.

Most only used OLS to estimate this effect and ignored any possible

endogeneity from private school measures.

The findings were varied in sign and

significance. Couch et al found a positive significant effect using only OLS, while Dee
found a positive significant effect only when using an IV approach. The other authors all
found insignificant effects that were varied in sign. All used some form of standardized
test scores as their measurements of public school achievement, with the exception of
Dee, who used high school graduation rates. Additional work has been done by Arum 19,
Bayer and McMillan20, and Simon and Lovrich21. Arum used state-level data, while
Simon and Lovrich used district-level data. Both papers used only OLS approaches and
12

J.F. Couch, W.F. Shughart and A.L. Williams, “Private School Enrollment and Public School
Performance,” Public Choice 76 (1993): 301-312.
13
T.S. Dee, “Competition and the Quality of Public Schools,” Economics of Education Review 17 (1998):
419-427.
14
C.R. Geller, D.L. Sjoquist and M.B. Walker, “The Effect of Private School Competition on
Public School Performance,” National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education Occasional Paper
No. 15 (2001).
15
R. Maranto, S. Milliman and S. Stevens. “Does Private School Competition Harm Public
Schools? Revisiting Smith and Meier’s ‘The Case Against School Choice’,” Political Research Quarterly
53 (2000): 177-192.
16
C.M. Newmark, “Another Look at Whether Private Schools Influence Public School Quality,”
Public Choice 82 (1995): 365-373.
17
Tim R. Sass, The effects of private school competition on public school performance: does
the type of competitor matter?, Florida State University, unpublished manuscript, (2001).
18
K.B. Smith and K.J. Meier, “Public Choice in Education: Markets and the Demand for Quality
Education,” Political Research Quarterly 48 (1995): 461-478.
19
R. Arum, “Do Private Schools Force Public Schools to Compete?,” American Sociological
Review 16 (1996): 29-46.
20
Patrick Bayer and Robert McMillan, “Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11802 (2005).
21
C.A. Simon and N.P Lovrich, Jr., “Private School enrollment and Public School Performance:
Assessing the Effects of Competition Upon Public School Student Achievement in Washington State,”
Policy Studies Journal 24 (1996): 666-675.

13

found positive coefficients on their private school measures, yet they were insignificant.
Bayer and McMillan chose metropolitan-level data and found significant positive
coefficients for their private school measures.22
Jepsen noted that the estimated effect of private school competition on public
school achievement varies largely due to the choice of the data set, the dependent
variable used to measure public school achievement, the level of aggregation used for the
private competition measure, and whether an OLS or IV approach is used. He used two
data sets with differing levels of aggregation, grade ranges and measures of public school
achievement to show that the coefficient on the private competition measure can vary.
The coefficients ranged in magnitude, sign and significance, but when coefficients were
significantly related to the public school measure of achievement, they were positive. He
also tried both OLS and IV approaches using various specifications and various measures
of Catholic population as the instrumental variable for his measure of private school
competition, percent of students attending private school.23
Looking at the previous literature on this subject, it seems that there is great
variation in the estimation of this private school effect. There does not seem to be an
overwhelming majority opinion that private school enrollment is positively or negatively
related to public school achievement. Given that this question still seems to be open,
testing to see if the effects are lagged may prove useful in unveiling the relationship
between public school achievement and private school enrollment.

22

Bayer and McMillan, “Choice and Competition in Local Education Markets.”
Christopher Jepsen, “The Role of Aggregation in Estimating the Effects of Private School
Competition on Student Achievement,” Journal of Urban Economics 52 (2002): 477-500.

23
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III.

Empirical Specification

Lazear thought of education as a good that individuals both consume and produce.
An individual may enjoy the process of learning as a pure consumption good, but may
increase the production of his education for the purposes of sale. The sale of education
would take place in the form of higher wages for more highly educated individuals. In
any case, Lazear showed that an individual’s production of education will depend on
attributes such as ability and parental factors, but one cannot separate the amount of
education demanded for pure consumption from the amount of education demanded for
wealth purposes, because they are joint products of education. In short, variables which
affect an individual’s production of education, regardless of the intent of that production,
will also affect the quality of public schooling. 24
Hoxby used a production function for education from a school achievement
perspective. The production of achievement involves some inputs provided by the school
itself or the surrounding educational market, others by the students and their parents,
others are exogenous to the model and some of the output will remain unexplained due to
unobservable inputs.25 Below, public school achievement is defined as a production
function for education in the spirit of Hoxby and Lazear:

(1)

Yijt = Xit β1 + Sijt β2 + Pijt β3 + Eit β4 + Eit-1 β5 + πijt +µ ijt + εijt

24

Edward Lazear, “Education: Consumption or Production?,” The Journal of Political Economy 85, no.
3 (1977): 569-598.
25
Hoxby, “Do Private Schools Provide Competition for Public Schools?.”
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Where, Yijt represents public school achievement or output, Xit is a vector of educational
market characteristics, Sijt is a vector of school characteristics, Pijt is a vector of parental
characteristics, Eit is enrollment in private schools, πijt is a vector of unobservable inputs,
µ ijt is a school specific error term and εijt is an individual specific error term. The indexes
are as follows: j is for the school, i is for the market and t is for time.
There are two terms for the variable of interest, private school enrollment: current
enrollment (t) and enrollment in the previous time period (t-1). It is likely that enrollment
in private schools in time period (t-1) will have some effect on public school output since
public institutions must first detect some kind of signal that they are “losing the
competition.” Since they cannot necessarily measure this in lost profits, two plausible
signals that they are in a more competitive environment might be a decline in enrollment
and lower test scores. Enrollment is likely to decline gradually rather than all at once
because parents must first seek out information regarding the relative qualities of
alternative education if they are unhappy with public school education. Parents will have
different preferences when it comes to educational quality and they will have different
search costs. So, after a gradual decline in public school enrollment, the public school
will begin to notice a trend and then eventually react.

Test scores are a more immediate

signal of the current level of quality, but it seems likely that a trend of declining test
scores would provoke more reaction than declining enrollment and infrequently low test
scores.
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There must be some lag in the information available to public schools that signal
it to change behavior. There must also be some lag between the signal and the actual
change in quality. In order to give students a better opportunity to succeed, schools will
need to hire better quality teachers, order updated textbooks, and provide better
technology, ect. So, realistically, the public school will not respond to a competitive
signal in the same period the signal was received and even more unlikely that public test
scores will show improvement in that same period. They may have a chance to respond
partially, but the full effect of those efforts probably will not show up immediately. To
account for any kind of partial response to increased competition, I have included current
observations in time period (t) for private school enrollment as an explanatory variable
for public school test scores. Various lag lengths are also explored to investigate when
the effects of a public response show up.
Unlike previous studies, this paper explores the possibility that public schools
may need time to adjust to higher levels of competition from surrounding private schools.
To explore this relationship empirically, I have used county-level panel data for
California from 58 counties over the years 1999-2005.26 As Hoxby notes, county-level
data are advantageous because narrow market definitions, like school districts, may give
biased estimates due to self-selection into better school districts.

Broad market

definitions, like states, are not likely to capture competitive effects as a private school on
one side of the state is unlikely to compete with a public school on the other side of the
state. County-level data are obviously not a perfect market definition, but they should

26

California has 59 counties, but Alpine County was omitted due to a lack of reporting.
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adequately avoid the problems associated with market definitions that are too narrow or
too broad.27
To measure public school achievement, I used standardized test scores from the
API (Academic Performance Index) exam, which is given only in California. There are
some problems with using standardized test scores to measure public school performance.
Kane and Staiger showed that school-level average test score data can be noisy and
distorted for many reasons, especially for smaller schools. 28
For example, distortions in school-level data may stem from the reality that much
of the improvement in a school’s average test score can be transitory and there are some
factors that are out of the school’s control. Also, test scores may be an incomplete
measurement of a school’s output as different schools may use varied subjects for their
tests.29

The test score data used in this study account for many of the problems

associated with this type of data. Averaging scores to the county-level should help the
sometimes extreme variation in annual scores for smaller schools with fewer test score
observations. The data set used in this paper should also better reflect school output
across counties since the API scores are for the same subjects across all schools and the
model aims to account for many factors that are out of a school’s control.
Though test scores are not a perfect measure of public school achievement, they
are likely to be the measurement by which parents and schools determine how well the
public school is doing. If so, as a child’s test scores decrease his parents may become
27
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more likely to send him to private school. Of course the school itself may be motivated to
change based on its relative performance compared to all other schools. In addition,
higher budgets and bonuses are typically awarded to public schools that have shown
improvement and are performing relatively better than other public schools on
standardized tests. Because parents and schools are likely to use test scores to compare
schools and many of the limitations of test scores as a measurement of achievement are
addressed, they should provide a relatively adequate measure of public school
achievement.
Educational market characteristics were accounted for by using county average
demographic measures including racial population homogeneity, the percent of public
schools that are middle schools, the percent of public schools that are high schools, and
two interaction terms where average public enrollment is multiplied by a dummy variable
for both middle and high schools.

Racial population homogeneity was included to

control for the fact that the more homogenous a population, the more likely the public
school will meet parental expectations; whereas, populations with distinctly differing
groups will likely be able to support several private schools that match the parental
expectations of each group. This will affect the degree to which public schools are
efficiently matched to parental expectations and the competitiveness of private schools.
The percentages of public schools that are middle and high schools and the two
interaction terms should account for the age of students taking the exam and how much
enrollment varies across schools.
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To account for school characteristics, I used the percentage of teachers having full
teaching credentials, student race percentages, public school enrollment, the variance of
public school enrollment, and the percent of students that are on a state-provided meal
plan. The percentage of teachers have full teaching credentials measures teacher quality
across counties and more qualified teachers will have a positive effect on the
performance of students as shown by Tamura.30 Ideally, spending per pupil would be
included as an additional school characteristic measure. Unfortunately, data on spending
per pupil by county were not reported, but using county fixed effects should help control
for the unreported data.
The educational attainment of parents plays an important role in school
performance as parents with higher levels of education are expected to make education a
priority for their children. Therefore, I have included the average educational attainment
of the parents of test takers as a measure of parental input. This measure is the average
educational attainment of the parents of students taking the exams, not the average
educational attainment for the entire county. Consequently, this should more accurately
capture differences in parental input for public school children across counties.

The

variables of interest, current and lagged private school enrollment, are meant to measure
the degree of competition public schools face from surrounding private schools. Current
private enrollment values have been used in previous studies on this subject, but lagged
values have not been explored. These variables are explained in detail in the next subsection.
30

Robert Tamura, “Teachers, Growth and Convergence,” Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 51
(2001): 1021-1059.
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IV.

Detailed Data Description

The API (Academic Performance Index) standardized test is given only in
California and has been given to all public school students in grades 2-12 every year
since 1999. The scores range from 200-1000 and include multiple content areas
depending on the subjects the Department of Education mandates should be covered in a
specific grade. But, the topics covered in each grade are uniform across schools. The
performance of each student is converted to points on the API scale and these points are
then averaged across all students within a school for all subjects; therefore, student-level
scores were not available. All schools are required to report school scores averaged
across all students with minimal exception. I have taken scores for all schools within
each county and calculated an enrollment-weighted county-level average to measure
public school achievement across counties. This variable should be able to capture the
relative county performance of California’s public schools while controlling for the
relative differences in school size within a county.
Not only are average API scores reported for every public school in California,
but students also report their races and the average education of their parents. The
average education of the parents of test takers is measured as follows: 0 = No High
school degree, 1 = High school degree, 2 = Some college, 3 = College degree, 4 =
Graduate degree. In addition, schools report their percentage of teachers with full
teaching credentials. California full teaching credentials include certifications such as
teaching multiple-subjects, teaching English learners, library media and adult and
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vocational education.31 Teaching credentials seem to be the best reported measure to
capture teacher quality within each county.
Data on API score, enrollment, the race of test takers, average parental education,
percentage of students on a state-provided meal plan and teaching credentials were
collected from the California Department of Education.32 All school-level data, including
the API score, teaching credentials, parental education, percentage of students on meal
plan and test-taker race variables, were weighted by school enrollment and then averaged
to the county level. The averages include 2nd through 12th graders for all public schools
within each county. I have pooled elementary, middle and high school students because
data on lagged private enrollment includes all three school types in the observation.
Moreover, I have controlled for the percentage of public middle and high school students
in the model. Controlling for the age cohort of students not only aids in providing
information on how test scores are affected by the age of the students, it also helps to
correct for any weighting done by the California Department of Education on the schoollevel API scores. These scores are weighted differently for elementary and middle/high
school students, so including dummy variables for school type and percentages of middle
and high school students help to correct for these previous weights. More information
can be found on the calculation of API scores at the California Department of
Education’s website.33
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Two variables will be used to estimate the private school effect on public school
performance. The percentage of total county enrollment that is private (percent private)
will be used to measure any immediate effects from competition; this measure is similar
to those used in previous studies. To capture lagged effects, some measure of past
private competition must be used. The only data available on private schools prior to
1999 in California are enrollment by county for the years 1980 and 1990. Since it is
possible that private school enrollment in 1980 has little if any discernable effect on
public school performance during the years 1999-2005, I have provided models both
including and excluding 1980 private enrollment. While these are certainly not perfect
measures, data limitations prevented me from using lagged data between 1991 and 1998.
What these measures will do is say something about how private enrollment has affected
public school test scores some ten to twenty years later.
An advantage of using such a long lag is that it seems reasonable that the effect
private schools have on public schools will not only take some time to become apparent,
but that public schools will also need adjustment time once the effect becomes noticeable.
For example, if a public school begins to decline in quality it is unlikely that students will
leave immediately. What is more realistic is that a small segment of parents may pull
their children out of public school in the middle of the year, and then a larger segment
may pull their children out after the end of the school year, and so on. This effect should
compound over time until eventually enough students have switched to private school
that it becomes apparent to the public school that something needs to be done to increase
the quality of public education. Because parents are more likely to gradually take their
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children out of public school, the immediate private school effect is probably less
pronounced than the lagged private effect. Data on past private enrollment (1990 and
1980) were obtained from Counting California. 34
Other variables included in the model are the percentage of students on a stateprovided meal plan, test taker race variables and controls for population homogeneity and
percentages of public enrollment that are middle and high school students.

The

percentage of students on a meal plan should control for the differences in test scores
across low and high income students. County level race variables were used to calculate
Herfindahl indices to measure the racial population homogeneity of each county. County
level population and race data were obtained from the California Department of
Finance.35

This project is part of the ongoing research of the Regional Economic

Measurement Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Summary statistics
are provided in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 of Appendix A.
The a priori sign expectations for the coefficients on current private enrollment
and private enrollment in 1990 are somewhat difficult to pin down. The coefficients for
the average education of parents and teacher quality measures should both be positive. I
expect that parents with more education will make education a priority for their children
as well and high quality teachers are likely to induce students to put forth more effort
than low quality teachers.

Since parents with more education tend to have higher

34
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incomes, I expect that counties with higher percentages of students on meal plans will
have lower test scores than counties with fewer students on meal plans.

V.

Estimation Technique

Mapping school level results to county level results
Much of the data used in this study was actually reported as the school-level
average rather than the county-level average. The exceptions were past levels of private
enrollment, number of schools, variance of public enrollment and county racial
population homogeneity. Because the county level seems the most appropriate market
definition and the variables of interest are only reported at the county level, I have
aggregated these school-level variables to the county level and weighted the appropriate
variables by school enrollment. Since there may be some potential problems in this
aggregation, I have provided a school-level model as a means of mapping the school
level results to the county level to further support aggregation as reasonable means of
market definition and estimation technique. Summary statistics of school-level variables
are provided in Table 2.3 and county-level variables are provided in Table 2.2 of
Appendix A.
The empirical specification for the school-level model was set up exactly like the
county-level model discussed in Section III with the natural log of the school’s average
test score as the dependent variable; however, the variables reported only at the county
level were omitted from the school level model. OLS was used to estimate this model
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and the results are reported in Table 2.4 of Appendix A. All coefficients were significant
at the 5% level and year fixed effects were incorporated to account for the use of panel
data over the years 1999-2005.
To compare the coefficients of interest for private enrollment between the school
and county levels, residuals were obtained from the school-level model in Table 2.4.
These residuals were then weighted by school enrollment, averaged to the county level
and used as the dependent variable in the model provided in Table 2.5 of Appendix A.
Because the dependent variable was originally logged in the school level equation, using
the weighed residuals as the dependent variable and the natural log of the independent
variables makes the specification in Table 2.5 a log-log specification and allows the
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. The residuals came from the natural log of
test scores, so there is no need to use the natural log of residuals in the specification in
Table 2.5. To map the private enrollment measures between school and county, private
enrollment observations from 1990, 1980 and current observations of private enrollment
were used as explanatory variables for the residuals from the school level model in Table
2.4.

In addition, the number of schools in the county, variance of public school

enrollment and county racial population homogeneity were also used to help explain the
unexplained portion of the school level model. A discussion comparing the school level
and county level coefficients follows in the next sub-section.
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Aggregated county level results
In order to obtain county level estimation results, the appropriate school level
variables were weighted by enrollment before aggregating them to the county level.
Those variables included test scores, parental education, teacher quality, percent of
students on a meal plan and race variables. After aggregating to the county level, the
empirical specification discussed in Section III was used to obtain OLS estimation results
as provided in Table 2.9. The specification for this OLS model used the natural log of
the enrollment-weighted test score as the dependent variable. Similarly, the independent
variables used in the school-level model in Table 2.4 were all accounted for in these
county level models, including both year and county fixed effects.
As shown in Table 2.9, the independent variable measures of private enrollment,
population homogeneity, number of schools and the variance of public enrollment were
included as explanatory variables for county average test scores.

To compare the

coefficients obtained in the school-level model and the averaged enrollment-weighted
residuals model with the county averaged enrollment-weighted test scores, the same
explanatory variables were accounted for in each.
I have compared the OLS coefficients obtained using county average data with
the coefficients obtained using school-level data and the residuals from the school-level
model in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. With a few exceptions, the coefficients across school and
county levels have consistency in their signs. The coefficients of interest are provided in
Table 2.8; OLS was used to estimate the coefficients on these private enrollment
variables.
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The coefficients on private enrollment in 1990 are positively related to both
county average test scores and the county average residuals from the school level model,
they are both significant at the 5% level regardless of whether private enrollment in 1980
was included in the model. The same is true regarding significance and sign on the
coefficients for 1980 private enrollment. The coefficient on 1990 private enrollment
becomes insignificant for the residuals model when 1980 private enrollment is included,
but remains significant in the county average test score model. The coefficients on
current private enrollment vary in sign and significance; the differences in coefficients for
private enrollment are discussed in the next sub-section.
Because the observations for both 1990 and 1980 private enrollment are repeated
for each of the 6 years in the panel in both the county average test score model and the
residuals model, the errors are clustered by county with a White’s correction for
heteroskedasticity.

Because year fixed effects were accounted for in the school level

model, only county fixed effects were accounted for in this residual county level model.
County and year fixed effects were accounted for in the county level test score model.
This mapping from a school level model to a county level model provides some
evidence that there are not massive problems in aggregating to the county level. So, if we
look at the OLS county level model in Table 2.9 we can see similar results to those of the
school level model. The coefficients on current observations of private enrollment and
on private enrollment in 1990 and 1980 provide evidence that the effects of competition
are lagged. Both coefficients on 1990 and 1980 private enrollment are positive and
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significantly related to current observations of public test scores for both the residuals
county level model and the test score county model.
The results indicate that higher private enrollment in 1990 and in 1980 in a
particular county led to public school students in that county performing better on
standardized test scores through the years 1999-2005. If higher test scores today are in
part results of higher private enrollment in the past it would seem to indicate that public
schools do eventually respond to competitive pressures. A discussion of the instrumental
variables (IV) approach used for both the residuals model in Table 2.6 and Table 2.10
follows in the next sub-section.

VI.

Estimation Results

There are likely some endogeneity problems in using OLS to estimate the model,
which will lead to estimates that are biased downward. As both Hoxby36 and Sander37
noted in the aforementioned studies private enrollment is potentially endogenous to
public school achievement. Here, current private enrollment has the potential to be a
choice variable for current observations. In other words, it is possible that parents are
choosing to send their children to private school because the public school is failing to
meet parental expectations. As with previous studies, this endogeneity can be corrected
by using the county-level Catholic population percentages as an instrument for current
observations of private school enrollment.
36
37
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Table 2.1: Private School Enrollment by Denomination for California and the US

Denomination
Catholic
Secular
Religious (Non-church affiliated)
Baptist
Lutheran
Assembly of God
Seventh-Day Adventist
Episcopal
Calvinist
Jewish
Church of Christ
Pentecostal
Other Religious (Church affiliated)

Percent of California Private
School Enrollment 2003-200438
37.6%
20.8%
15.2%
4.3%
4.3%
2.4%
2.3%
1.6%
1.2%
1.2%
0.6%
0.5%
8.1%

Percent of US Private School
Enrollment 2003-200439
27.9%
24.0%
14.0%
7.7%
6.0%
1.5%
3.4%
1.2%
0.5%
2.9%
0.6%
1.4%
9.0%

The intuition behind this instrument is that Catholic schools make up the largest
percentage denomination of all private schools in the U.S. and parents are likely to send
their children to Catholic school based on family religious preferences. The percentage
of Catholic private schools in California is actually higher than the national average, as
shown in Table 2.1 above, making Catholic population per county a reasonable
instrument to explore.
Table 2.6 in Appendix A provides coefficients from the residuals model where
current observations of private enrollment are instrumented with Catholic population
38
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39
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http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/tables/table_2004_03.asp (accessed April 12, 2007).
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percentages.

The coefficients for 1990 and 1980 continue to remain positive and

significantly related to the unexplained portion of the school level model, providing
further evidence for lagged competitive effects; however, current observations for private
enrollment, once instrumented, are insignificant.
Table 2.10 provides a county-level model with the natural log of test scores as the
dependent variables.

In this model, current observations of private enrollment are

instrumented using Catholic population percentages.

Again, current observations of

private enrollment are measured by the variable percent private. The coefficient is
insignificant in the IV county test score models for both the fixed effects and non-fixed
effects specifications.

Judging from the varied outcomes of this coefficient from

previous studies and from the results discussed in the last sub-section, it seems that the
immediate private enrollment effect on public school performance is unclear. As shown
by Jepsen, depending on the data set, the aggregation level, the measure of public school
performance and the estimation technique, the significance and sign on this coefficient
varies quite a bit.40
A possible explanation of the variation in the immediate private enrollment effect
may be that the ability-type of the students leaving public school varies, leaving mixed
results for the mean ability of students remaining in public schools. Hoxby provided
some evidence that not all high ability students are sorted out of public school. Some
counties may have more behavioral disorder students leaving for a military-like private
school, whereas other counties may have more high ability students leaving in order to
40
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feel more academically challenged in a private school with a reputation for high
educational quality.41 On the other hand, there may be low-ability, high-income students
leaving for private school based on parental preferences.
Whatever the reason for the decrease in public enrollment, the mean ability of the
students remaining in public schools may be varied and schools may not immediately
react by hiring higher quality teachers or ordering better textbooks. This process is likely
to take some time in addition to the time it takes to realize that students are leaving public
schools in favor of private ones and/or that the mean student ability had decreased. So,
test scores in the same year as the rise in private enrollment could go either way, or could
be initially unaffected.
The lack of better instruments could be the cause of the insignificance among the
coefficients in the IV model in Table 2.10. Because the independent variables in this
model are indeed related to public school performance in both the school level/residuals
and county level OLS models, the IV model may benefit from the exploration of other
instruments for current observations of private enrollment.

Investigation of shorter lags
To further investigate the effects of private school enrollment on public school
performance, I have included OLS coefficients for one, two, three and four year lags on
private enrollment in Table 2.11 of Appendix A. The purpose of this analysis was to see
if public schools are affected to the point of reaction by competitive pressures one, two,

41
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three or four years later. This limits the number of observations available since data on
recent private enrollment only covers the years 1999-2005, so longer lags have fewer
observations in the panel; therefore, there would be too few observations for lags longer
than four years. I included each lag in place of private enrollment (t) in the same period
and used the same specifications shown in Table 2.9.
The results were mixed in sign and were all insignificant, suggesting that the
effects of more private competition on public school test scores are unclear or
insignificant up to four years later. It seems that these results provide additional evidence
that immediate competitive effects are unclear because public schools take time to notice
the effect and then adjust.

The coefficients are negative for the one-year lag and then

become positive the longer the lag, which may indicate that students leave, then test
scores decline and eventually rise after the public school quality level is increased. Yet,
the effects remain insignificant and further research is needed to identify if this
relationship is indeed negative for a period of time and then becomes positive.
Additional data are being collected to add to this line of research.

VII.

Conclusion

If the evidence in the analysis of this chapter is correct, private educational
markets do provide some positive externalities for students remaining in public schools;
however, these externalities do not seem to appear until many years later. While public
schools may lack the same financial incentives as private schools to provide quality
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education, they do respond to competition from private schools which offer substitutable
educational goods. This is certainly not to say that all public schools provide a lower
quality education than their private school neighbors; it may be quite the opposite. What
this study implies is that public schools react when private schools begin to attract a
larger customer base and both low and high ability, low-income students enrolled in
public schools will eventually benefit from this private market effect.
Of course these results may be limited to California, but they do shed some light
on the problem of identifying the existence and timing of a private school effect on public
school performance. If more competition does indeed increase public school quality, it is
possible that eventually fewer parents will pay for private school. As with any positive
externality, less than the socially efficient amount of private schooling may be consumed
if public school students receive benefits from other students paying to switch to private
schools. But, if the increased quality in public schooling takes long enough to show up,
then future public school students will benefit from former students paying to send a
signal that induces public school quality changes. I hope to explore this subject further as
more data are available through the California Department of Education and other
sources.
The use of an extensive data set will promote accuracy, and in future research I
also hope to explore different lags of private enrollment to help explain public school
performance. It has yet to be determined what the exact signal for public school change
might be. Do public schools react to higher levels of competition from private schools
because of decreased test scores, which imply lower mean student ability within the
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public school?

Or, do they respond to gradually decreasing levels of enrollment?

Research on additional lags may help answer these questions.
Further research should also be done with various levels of aggregation across the
U.S. in order to obtain more exact estimates of the existence of a private school effect.
As data become available, it would also be informative to look at other measures for
public school achievement and for the private school effect. In any case, it is informative
to look at this effect with the notion that public institutions in general do not have the
same incentives as private institutions and are therefore unlikely to respond to
competition as quickly or maybe not at all. Simply recognizing this likelihood in future
analysis may give us a better understanding of public school behavior in the face of
private market competition.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SETTINGS THAT FOSTER INTEREST GROUP
FORMATION ACROSS US STATES

I.

Introduction

Economic research has shed a great deal of light on the functions and objectives of
interest groups as well as how they go about attaining those objectives. Welch provided
evidence that interest groups tend to contribute to the likely winner in order to gain
political favor once the candidate is elected rather than contributing to candidates
specifically to sway a political outcome.42 Interest groups have been thought to serve
many roles in the political process. Epstein and O’Halloran described how they may aid
in the provision of information to policy makers on certain issues; however, this
information may be biased towards the group’s objective.43 Work by Austen-Smith
proposed a theoretical model of how interest groups can help determine the policy
positions of legislators based on how large their campaign contributions are.44
Many authors have studied how interest groups are related to numerous political
facets, but few have empirically uncovered the settings that foster interest group
formation in the first place. There are a handful of authors who have tackled this subject
using cross-country approaches, but few have used U.S. state-level data. Presumably the
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problem with state level data is that states are too empirically close in aspects such as
political systems and levels of stability. However, if Mancur Olson’s predictions about
institutional sclerosis are correct, more interest group activity is stifling to economic
growth. 45 If this is true, it is important to know the environment that lends itself to more
interest groups as related to U.S. states in order to further explain income and growth
differences.
Bischoff states that Olson’s46 theory consists of a chain with three elements: “First,
the number of interest groups in a country increases with the duration of its political
stability. Second, interest group activities have a negative influence on economic growth.
Third, the overall influence of interest groups increases with their number.” 47 Since U.S.
states have similar levels of political stability, there must be other factors at work causing
differences in their numbers of interest groups. This chapter explores those other factors
in an attempt to uncover the first element in the chain for U.S. states. In this study I have
employed similar methods from cross-country studies to test other factors besides
political stability in order to determine which ones are important in explaining interest
group formation across U.S. states.

II.

Review of Literature

Cross-country studies should provide a reasonable background and starting point for
explaining differences in group formation in the states. All of the following papers use
45
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trade associations as the dependent variable measure for number of interest groups in a
given country or region.
Peter Murrell has looked at this problem from two angles. Murrell first used nongovernmental trade associations to measure interest groups for 24 OECD countries. As
explanatory variables for how the numbers of associations vary across countries, he
included population, measures of political systems, size and structure of government,
socioeconomic development and diversity. He found that population, decentralization of
government and lengths of time of modernization are all positive and significant
determinants of numbers of interest groups. Measures of democracy were not important
in determining the number of groups, but measures of socioeconomic development were
somewhat important. Due to the lack of observations in Murrell’s study and the large
number of explanatory variables, he used simple correlations and step-wise regression
methods to support these results.48
Kennelly and Murrell looked at a cross section of 75 industries in 10 countries to see
how numbers of interest groups vary based on industrial and political characteristics.
Their measure of interest groups includes only the trade associations within each
industry. Because some industries have zero interest groups, resulting in a truncated
dependent variable, they used a Tobit analysis. This analysis is unique in that it used
industrial-level data across countries rather than aggregated country-level data. Various
measures of the costs and benefits of forming trade associations as well as countryspecific characteristics were included as explanatory variables. The authors proposed that
48
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opposition to trade organizations will come from the buyers of that industry’s output and
from foreign competition. They found that more trade associations are established in
industries that feel threatened by consumer and foreign competitor opposition. That is,
the larger the proportion of an industry’s output bought by households and the more
imports/exports in an industry, the more trade associations that will result.49
To capture the demand for trade associations among industries, they included labor’s
share of output, elasticity of demand for the industry’s product, and the four-firm
concentration ratio in the industry. The greater labor’s share of output, the more likely
labor is to lobby for government assistance; and, the greater the number of firms in an
industry, the larger the need for government assistance through lobbying.

Trade

associations are also more likely to form when demand is inelastic because price
increases increase industry revenues. The authors also included some country specific
explanatory variables such as population, per capita income and business fluctuations, but
most were unimportant in explaining number of trade associations. To account for
potential endogeneity, they used predicted values from regressions on exogenous
variables rather than actual observations for imports, exports, government size and
subsidies.50
Bischoff tested the theory of institutional sclerosis by showing that countries which
have been economically stable for long periods of time tend to accumulate more interest
groups. He used a similar empirical approach to that of Murrell with country-level data
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for 21 OECD countries. He showed that political stability does not have a significant
impact on the number of interest groups within a country, despite Olson’s theory that
political stability is the main element to cause initial increases in groups.51 Bischoff’s
empirical analysis also used the number of trade associations, excluding Chambers of
Commerce, as the measure of interest groups within a country.52
The explanatory variables included are population, GNP, imports as a share of GDP,
share of government expenditures of GDP, share of urban population and political
stability.

Population and GDP had significant and positive coefficients.

All other

variables were not important factors in explaining trade associations across OECD
countries. When using trade associations per one million inhabitants as the dependent
variable, coefficients on imports as a share of GDP became significantly positive and
coefficients on government expenditures became significantly negative.53
Coates, Heckleman and Wilson looked at interest group formation across 140
countries, both OECD and non-OECD. In keeping with previous studies, they also used
trade associations in each country to measure number of interest groups. One important
aspect of this study that distinguishes it from other studies is the number of observations.
They used 5 years worth of data for 140 countries, which implies that they may have
more precise estimates than others using fewer observations. 54
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The authors used several measures of stability, development, political system, nation
size, government size and diversity to explain differences in numbers of trade
organizations across these countries. The authors suggested that income, government
spending and import share are all potentially endogenous regressors for number of trade
associations. To correct for this, they used a log-log specification with lagged values as
instruments.

Their findings implied that a nation’s stability, political system, size,

diversity and socioeconomic development are the key explanatory variables for interest
group formation. Each explained group formation as predicted by theory. A more stable
and developed nation under a democratic system will foster the growth of trade
associations. Also, more interest groups will form the larger the nation and the more
diverse its society.55
Benson and Engen defined the number of interest groups that form in a particular
political market as a function of the quantity of output from the legislative process.
They also defined the quantity of legislative output demanded as a function of the price
of that output, the income of the demanders and the opportunity costs of buying
government favor. This study used the number of registered lobbyists in 1975 as a crosssectional measure for interest groups in U.S. states.

They defined the number of

lobbyists as a function of population size and growth, income, age of population,
education and legislative bills passed in the previous year. The authors also define the
number of legislative bills passed as a function of the number of lobbyists, the size of the
legislature, the length of the legislative session, how often the legislature meets, the
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senate-to-house ratio, the proportion of the legislature that is of the majority party, the
number of committees per legislator and the average number of assignments per
committee. 56
Their results indicated that the number of lobbyists has a positive relationship with
population size and growth, per capita income, age of population, education and a
negative relationship with the previous number of bills passed by the legislature. They
also found that the number of bills passed has a positive relationship with the size of the
legislature, length of the session, the number of lobbyists, the percentage of majority
party members, the senate-to-house ratio and the number of committees, and a negative
relationship with how often the legislature meets and the average number of assignments
per committee.57
McChesney argued that interest groups compete for consumer surplus rents on both
the production and consumption sides of the market. The most common basis used to
explain why consumers organize less frequently than producers is that they have higher
costs of organization related to free-riding; however, McChesney noted many other
reasons to explain why trade associations are more widespread than consumer oriented
organizations. Trade associations provide additional industry benefits beyond those of
obtaining transfers from the government. Organizing allows the exchange of information
and the development of industry standards that lower production costs and increase
industry demand. Consumers also have smaller individual shares of rents, making it
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easier for their own surplus to be extracted and given to others. And, organization
attracts attention from politicians increasing the likelihood of surplus extraction;
therefore, consumer groups are more likely to experience a negative outcome of
organization than producer groups that have higher individual rent shares.58 This study
provides support for using trade associations to measure interest groups across states as
they make up the majority of organized interests.
McChesney also discussed an interesting reason for group formation, yet one that
seems impossible to distinguish in the data. He explained “milker bills,” which are a
means of extortion for legislators to obtain favor from special interest groups. This type
of legislation threatens to extract rents or increase the costs of production for an industry,
which provokes a response in the form of campaign contributions from groups to prevent
its passage. In essence, legislators can “milk” money out of groups by threatening to pass
rent-extracting legislation.59 More of this type of activity will surely result in more
interest groups/interest group activity, but measuring this narrowly legal activity would
prove difficult.

III.

Data Description

Two approaches to measuring interest group activity were taken in this study to
explain the differences in interest groups across U.S. states. Both used state-level panel
58
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data for all 50 states over the years 1990-2005.60 As with previous studies, the dependent
variable was measured by using the number of trade associations in each state excluding
Chambers of Commerce. The second approach used trade associations per capita in
following Bischoff’s use of trade associations per one million inhabitants.61

Both

approaches will allow my results to be comparable to previous studies done with countrylevel data.

All data on trade associations were collected from the IRS exempt

organization data files.62 Summary statistics for all variables are available in Table 3.1 of
Appendix B.

Description of Dependent Variables
Number of Trade Associations and Trade Associations per Capita: In keeping with
previous studies, the number of trade associations excluding Chambers of Commerce was
used to measure the number of interest groups per state. While data was available on all
tax-exempt organizations, trade associations have a greater incentive to push narrow
agendas through lobbying. Labor unions would be a welcome addition to this measure of
interest groups; however, they are not tax-exempt and were therefore not included in the
reported data.
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The literature appeals to the definition of two interest group categories as set forth by
Salisbury. 63 Interest groups may be either “sectional” in that they undertake economic
activities specific to the group, or they may be “promotional” in that they promote
specific ideas common to the group. So, in the spirit of Murrell I have included only
sectional interest groups, which he defines as, “non-governmental formal organizations
whose members share sectional interests the attainment of which requires the production
of goods which have, to some extent, the properties of public goods.”64 While some
measure of the political influence of each interest group would be more ideal, no measure
is currently available. Because population has proven to be a large determinant of trade
associations I have also used trade associations per capita as a second measure of interest
groups.

Description of Explanatory Variables
Some of the explanatory variables used in cross-country studies should also be
important in explaining interest groups across U.S. states.

Other cross-country

explanatory variables may be too similar across U.S. states to have any discernable effect.
The following is a description of the explanatory variables used in my analysis and the
expected signs on their coefficients.
Population: I included population as an explanatory variable for number of trade
associations as it has been an important determinant for cross-country studies. Murrell
63

R.H. Salisbury, “Interest Groups,” in Nongovernmental Politics Handbook of Political Science, ed. F.I.
Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975) : 257-319.
64
Peter Murrell, “An Examination of the Factors Affecting the Formation of Interest Groups in OECD
Countries,” Public Choice 43 (1984): 153.

45

notes that population may have opposing effects on the number of groups. In other
words, as population increases, there should be more groups; but, as population increases,
the heterogeneity of the population will also increase, thus decreasing the number of
“common goals” within a group and decreasing the benefits of joining a group to any one
member.

Yet, population was positively related to number of groups in all

aforementioned cross-country empirical studies. Because it is also expected that the cost
of regulation per person decreases with population I expect the sign on population to be
positive in this analysis as well.
Per Capita Income: As discussed above, measures of socioeconomic development
were found to be important in determining interest group activity in many studies. But,
as noted by Coates, Heckleman and Wilson, income may be endogenous to number of
groups.65

To account for this, I also used lagged values of per capita income to

instrument current per capita income.66 Included in my results are both OLS and IV
estimates of the per capita income effect on trade associations. Data on per capita income
was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.67 The sign on this has traditionally
been found to be positive, but should be left to the data as there are opposing substitution
and income effects. Because the opportunity cost of time increases with income, it will
be more costly to spend time lobbying; however, high income states have more money to
spend on forming groups and pushing agendas.
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Number of Committees in the Senate: Crain and Tollison explain differences in the
sizes of majorities in state legislatures using independent variables such as the number
and size of legislative committees. They find that both have a positive impact on the size
of legislative majorities and that this relationship holds because majorities attempt to
organize the legislature and committee systems to their advantage. 68
What is important about those results for this study is that the authors explained how
committees will hold hearings and conduct investigations in order to see what demanders
of legislation (i.e. interest groups) want. More committees will be able to monitor more
special interests, and therefore more committees should result in more interest groups.69
This topic was also explored by Kroszner and Stratmann for the financial services
sector. They found that committees offer avenues for repeated business between interest
groups and legislators. Committees provide an enforcement mechanism for “fee-forservice” agreements between legislators and interest groups since these contracts cannot
legally be written and enforced. The authors also offered that the use of committees in
this way implies that term-limits, which create greater legislative turnover, destabilize
committee reputation.70 Because the house and senate are the only two possibilities for
committee residence, I have included the number of committees in the senate and used
the house committees as the omitted variable.
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Senate Majority Sizes:

Also following Crain and Tollison, a larger number of

members in a legislative majority party will increase the costs to groups of obtaining a
majority vote. Therefore, included as explanatory variables for trade associations were
the number of members in the majority party for the house.71 Again, both senate and
house majority sizes are highly correlated, so house majorities were omitted. I expect the
sign on the senate majority size coefficient to be negative.
Another effect this variable may pick up is one discussed by Levmore. He explained
that political instability may be a breeding ground for interest group activity because it is
easier to push agendas where there is no majority to overpower. If there is a clear
majority opinion against an interest group’s agenda and this opinion is obviously revealed
in recurring elections, then the interest group is less likely to form in this stable political
environment. But, if the majority opinion is unstable, interest groups may find it easier to
push their agendas.72
Majority Party: To examine whether one party’s control in either chamber of the
legislature is associated with more or less groups, I have included a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the Republicans have the majority party and 0 otherwise. This dummy
variable was included only for the Senate.
Length of State Constitution: Anderson, et al. specified a model of constitutional
change using the interest group theory of government.

They showed that the one

government instrument thought to be above the reach of interest group activity, the
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constitution, is actually a vehicle for it. Those interest groups who are able to secure a
constitutional amendment in their favor may expend more resources than for a legislative
bill because the legislative route lacks the durability of a constitutional amendment. They
measured durable wealth transfers to interest groups by the length of state constitutions
and they showed that independent judiciaries help to impart this durability onto
constitutional amendments. They also noted that former members of the Confederacy
have tended to completely scrap their constitution and rewrite it, which leaves room for
interest groups to vie for favors. 73
I have included the length of state constitutions, in words, to account for the
possibility of durable wealth transfers within a state. The sign on this coefficient is hard
to pin down because it may be that trade associations who have managed to secure a
durable constitutional wealth transfer have market power over state funds, leaving little
room for additional interests to secure any kind of wealth transfer. But, if the state
constitution is long, associations may see this as a signal that durable transfers are more
easily available than in states with shorter constitutions.
House-to-Senate Ratio: According to the study done by Anderson, Tollison and
Shughart, the house-to-senate ratio reflects the degree of bicameralism in state
legislatures. As the number of representatives in the house rises in relation to the number
of senators, the optimal majority in either chamber is expected to be larger. So, this
increases the cost of obtaining a majority vote in either chamber and states with larger
73
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house-to-senate ratios (H/S) should have fewer interest groups; therefore, I expect the
sign on the H/S ratio to be negative. 74
State Transfer Payments in Dollars: All previous studies used some measure of
government size to explain trade associations across countries. The amount of state
government transfer payments should account not only for government size, but also the
degree of incentive for additional interest groups to form provided through government
handouts to others. Theory suggests that the more government handouts the larger the
number of begging hands. Bischoff finds that government expenditures are negatively
related, contradictory to theory, but only had access to 18 observations of government
expenditures.75

Coates, Heckleman and Wilson have suggested that government

spending is endogenous to the number of trade associations, and they used lagged values
as an instrument for current values of government spending to attack this potential
problem. 76
Laband and Sophocleus estimated the amount of resource expenditures on nonexchange, non-charity transfer payments.

They used data on expenditures spent on

acquiring or preventing transfers, and their numbers suggest that over a trillion dollars
was spent in the U.S. in 1985 on this kind of activity.

They conclude that transfers,

whether acquired through private investment or social accord, are costly and a great deal
of economic activity is concerned with the acquisition of transfers rather than the creation
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of wealth.77 Assuming that interest groups are the main seekers of these transfers, this
type of spending should more precisely measure the spending done specifically on
interest group appeasement.
To address the potential endogeneity of transfer payments, I have included an OLS as
well as an IV approach to measuring the effect of government spending on transfer
payments on the number of trade associations. I have mimicked the Coates, Heckleman
and Wilson approach by using lagged values of transfer payments to instrument current
values of government spending.78
Size of Legislature: As Stigler observes, geographical legislative size tends to be
independent of the size of the area. 79 He notes several reasons this might be the case,
one being that, “an area represents substantial and well-defined interest groups.”80
Therefore, I have included the size of each state legislature with the expectation that a
larger legislature is associated with more interest groups. However, the direction of
causation is questionable since more well-defined interests may result in more
representatives of those interests. Data on committees, majority sizes and parties, houseto-senate ratio, government spending, length of state constitutions and sizes of state
legislatures were collected from the Book of States.81
Heterogeneity of Industry: McCormick and Tollison explained that homogeneity
among interests within a population will result in fewer transfers than populations with
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heterogeneous interests.

Separate interests generate distinct groups, some more

organized than others, which will in turn seek to obtain transfers in their favor.82 Benson
and Engen also note that the heterogeneity of a population should be considered when
explaining interest groups across U.S. states.83
When Kennelly and Murrell look at how trade associations form across industries,
they include measures of the demand for trade associations, such as the four-firm
concentration ratio. That ratio captures a measure of firms within the industry and the
authors show that more firms result in more trade associations in an industry.84 For
similar reasoning, I have investigated two measures of the heterogeneity of industry
within each state.
These measures were calculated in the following ways:

The first measure is a

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated by using the shares of numbers of firms
within an industry relative to total firms in all industries. Since sheer numbers of firms
within an industry says nothing about the relative size of firms, I also calculated the HHI
using the annual payroll for each industry relative to the annual payroll for all industries.
Because there are discrepancies when only looking at the top four industries, I have used
the HHI rather than a four-firm concentration ratio. See Figure 3.1 in Appendix B for a
detailed description of the calculation method used for these measures.
These Herfindahl indexes should provide information regarding the relative
concentration of industries in a given state. For example, Virginia has a particularly large
82
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tobacco/agricultural industry and Indiana has a particularly large manufacturing industry.
Therefore, the HHI for each of these states should be relatively high since total industry
within each state is very concentrated in one particular area. A relatively low HHI would
be indicative of a state with more dispersed types of industry, such as Delaware and
Georgia. 85
I expect that a more dispersed industry would lead to more total trade associations,
whereas states with high levels of industry concentration would lead to more associations
within the dominant industry. Consequently, it is likely that there are opposing effects on
the sign of the HHI coefficient. For example, a large manufacturing industry will lead to
more manufacturing trade associations, but when industry is dispersed among many types
there are likely to be more overall trade associations. It is up to the data to determine
which effects are larger. Unfortunately, this data was only available through the Census
Bureau for the years 1998-2005, so I have included regressions with and without these
measures in the interest of utilizing all observations.86

IV.

Empirical Approach and Results

For each model, a log-log form was used so that coefficients may be interpreted as
elasticities. As mentioned above, there is a potential endogeneity problem with transfer
spending and per capita income in association with trade organizations. To account for
85
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this, I have included both an OLS approach and an IV approach. The IV approach uses
lagged values of transfers to instrument transfer payments, and lagged values of per
capita income are used to instrument per capita income.87

Regression results are

provided in Tables 3.2-3.9 of Appendix B.

Using Number of Trade Associations as the Dependent Variable
Tables 3.2-3.5 provide both OLS and IV results using the natural log of the number of
trade associations as the dependent variable.

When using the number of trade

associations as the dependent variable, population seems to have a significant impact on
the number of associations.

The coefficient is positive in all but one instrumental

variables model, which follows the results in other studies using country-level data. And,
this implies that more associations form as population increases and that the cost of
regulation per person decreases as population increases.
The coefficient on per capita income is positive and significant for the models
excluding fixed effects, but negative and significant in the fixed effects models. A
possible explanation for this discrepancy is that there may be two opposing effects on the
per capita income coefficient. First, previous studies have found this coefficient to be
positive, indicating that more interest groups form with more socio-economic
development. Second, the coefficient may also be picking up the decline in economic
development due to a dissipation of productive resources by interest groups.
possibility is explored in a study provided in the next chapter.
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This

The coefficient on numbers of senate committees varies in sign based on whether
fixed effects are accounted for in the model. With fixed effects unaccounted for, the sign
is unexpectedly negative and significant; yet, when accounting for fixed effects the sign
varies and is insignificant. There may also be opposing effects at work here. More
committees serve more interests, while more committees may make the legislature too
balkanized and therefore too difficult for new interests groups to gain a significant
foothold in a vast array of committees. The increased number of committees may serve a
wider array of interests from only a few incumbent interest groups, rather than serving
the interests of additional groups. Also, the more committees from whom you must
obtain favor, the higher the cost of obtaining legislation for a given interest group.
Senate majority sizes follow the a priori expectations in that the coefficient is
significant and negatively related to number of trade associations. Since larger majority
sizes imply higher costs of obtaining legislation, there are likely to be fewer interests in
states with larger majority sizes. The dummy variable used to measure Republican senate
majorities does not seem to provide a definitive answer regarding the differences in the
two main political parties. The coefficient is positive when significant, yet I would
expect that each party has their own interests more so than one party having more
interests than the other, which may explain the variation in sign on this dummy variable.
The length of state constitutions also seems to be negatively related to the number of
trade associations. This suggests that maybe a few interest groups were originally able to
corner the market in securing constitutional transfers and keep others from doing so.
Additionally, it may be that the average price for a transfer is higher in those states with
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more constitutional handouts. If these durable transfers have occurred more often, it may
be that the dollar price per length of durability is higher for a legislative bill than for a
constitutional amendment. If so, groups may choose to form in states with a lower dollar
price per length of durability for legislative bills.
The negative coefficient on the house-to-senate ratio measure implies that the theory
discussed in the literature holds. Higher house-to-senate ratios mean a higher price for
legislation and thus fewer interest groups. The coefficient on state transfer payments
follows the intuition that bigger government handouts will lead to more begging hands.
The coefficient is positive and significant in nearly all cases.
The size of legislatures appears to be an important factor in how many trade
associations form within a state. The coefficient is almost always significant and is
always positively related to the number of trade associations in each of the models.
While the sign on this coefficient was expected to be negative given that larger
legislatures would seem more costly to win over in the passage of a legislative bill, it is
actually positively related to the number of trade boards. This result may be explained by
the likely increase in the number of groups that have access to a legislator when there are
more legislators available. Greater access to a legislator may signal greater ease with
which opinions are heard during sessions.
In obtaining these results I used both the Herfindahl index calculated with the number
of firms and the index calculated with the payroll of firms. The results did not change
significantly whether using one measure or the other; therefore, I have only included
results using the Herfindahl index calculated with payroll data so as to account for the

56

relative differences in firm size across state industries. Given the coefficient obtained on
the HHI measure, it seems that the more concentrated a state’s industry, the fewer trade
associations the state will have. This seems intuitively correct as highly concentrated
industries will have more homogenous ideologies concerning wealth transfers.

In

addition, highly powerful and concentrated industries might corner the market on trade
associations giving smaller, less powerful groups a narrow margin for obtaining favorable
legislation.

Using Trade Associations Per Capita as the Dependent Variable
Tables 3.6-3.9 provide both OLS and IV results using the natural log of trade
associations per capita as the dependent variable. When using trade associations per
capita as the dependent variable the results remain similar to those found using the
number of trade associations to measure interest groups.

The per capita income

coefficient remains positively related to trade associations when fixed effects are not
accounted for and negatively related in the fixed effects models. The numbers of senate
committees still have negative relationship with trade associations per capita without
accounting for fixed effects; so, it seems that any relationship between committees and
groups is dominated by the balkanization of legislature rather than the effect many
committees could provide by serving a variety of interests.
Majority size continues to have a negative impact on trade associations and
Republican senate majority continues to vary in its impact. Length of state constitutions
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and the homogeneity of industry have coefficients that remain negative, whereas the
house-to-senate ratio and size of legislature have coefficients that remain positive.

V.

Conclusion

Although more data would be highly useful in pinning down the settings that foster
interest group development, this chapter has provided some evidence that population
differences, socioeconomic development, differences in the structure of legislature,
government and industry, and public funds spending are important factors in determining
interest group formation. Even though U.S. states are more similar in certain aspects than
a panel of countries, it is still important to know what factors contribute to increased
groups that actively rent seek. It is especially important to be able to articulate these
factors in countries with high levels of socioeconomic development, as interest groups
use up the real resources that would continue to help developed countries excel.
Research in this area will aid in untangling private and political interests and their
effect on state economic development. If the theory of institutional sclerosis is correct,
then pointing out factors that contribute to this sclerosis is important for understanding
how to prevent or diminish it. This is certainly not a comprehensive investigation of
those factors; it is merely an attempt to further understand the impact of interest groups
within a single country. For future work on this topic I plan to break up the industry
measures into a measure specifically for agricultural firms and a measure for the
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heterogeneity of all other industries as agricultural industries tend to have significant
impacts with lobbying efforts.
Future work on this topic should explore alternative measures of interest group
activity. One alternative measure should account for the relative sizes of groups, such as
the number of members or the financial backing behind a group. Data are currently being
collected on the assets of groups with the intention of providing a group-level data study
of activity in obtaining political favor.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTEREST GROUP EFFECT ON US STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

I. Introduction
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Differences in economic development across U.S. states have been attributed to
many factors such as differences in the accumulation of both human and physical capital;
however, the question this chapter attempts to answer is what impact do interest groups
have in this area. Olson first posed this question in his book, The Rise and Decline of
Nations.88 Since then, many authors have addressed rent seeking under the interest group
theory of government and the relationship those groups have with politicians and
regulation. In the decades of research on this topic, the literature has come closer to
unraveling the mysteries of interest groups and government. Yet, less contribution has
been made to find out if interest groups dissipate real resources to the degree that
economic development and growth are affected. My research is meant to supplement
Olson’s original work and the existing literature on pressure groups in the public choice
area.
The interest group theory of government is best described by Crain and Tollison
as a situation in which, “… legislation is sold to groups who bid for the protective shelter
of the state.”89 But, what types of transfers might an interest group try to gain from the
government? Stigler outlines the four types of state aid that interest groups might try to
acquire:

1) direct cash subsidies, 2) control over new entrants, 3) influence over

substitute and complement markets, and 4) price fixing. He notes that direct cash
subsidies have been obtained in the past by airlines, colleges and universities, and war
veterans. He does suggest that the acquisition of direct cash subsidies are likely not the
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most preferred government favor because the money will have to be spread out over more
group members if group member entry is not controlled.90
Tullock discussed the US automotive industry’s attempt to control new entrants
by obtaining import restrictions on Japanese vehicles. He notes that the automotive
industry received great pressure from the United Auto Workers and rather than build
lower cost production facilities to better compete with foreign competition, the auto
industry first went to Washington to try and obtain special import restrictions. While
they eventually did take measures to lower production costs for American made cars,
import quotas on Japanese vehicles were also put in place by legislators as a means of
retaining the votes of the automotive industry in times of re-election.91
Marvel showed that groups may form within an industry to gain regulation that
weakens the high cost firms in such a way that limits competition. As an example of
influence over substitute goods, he explained that steam-mill firms lobbied for the British
Factory Acts of the 1830s in order to raise the production costs of water-mill firms. The
pretense for this legislation was that it was immoral to allow women and children to work
long hours and that their working hours should be limited; however, the effect of this
legislation was that it also limited the output from water-mill firms because they worked
longer hours when water flow was fast and shorter hours when it was slow. This did not
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have the same effect on steam-mill owners because their working hours did not depend
on water flow, but it did limit the amount of competition steam-mill owners faced.92
Posner pointed out many examples of industries that lobbied to be regulated in the
interest of price fixing. In the interest of maintaining the railroad cartel, railroad firms
supported the Interstate Commerce Act that prevented them from practicing price
discrimination.

AT&T, truckers and airlines all supported regulation that prevented

competition from becoming “excessive” within their industries. Formally disguised as
pro-consumer laws, they would unlikely be supported by the regulated firms unless there
was something to gain from regulation. As most consumers find organization more
costly than firms within the same industry, real resources were allocated by these firms
toward procuring regulatory legislation that would aid in maintaining high prices and
hampering competition. In addition, Posner notes that contrary to the thoughts of many
on the extreme left, big business interests are hardly the only ones served in government.
Interests from labor unions, agricultural firms and many blue collar industries are also
served by those in Congress.93
Interest groups expend real resources to get special favors from the government,
which are many times artificially created rents such as state-granted monopoly rights.
Regardless of the rent that is captured, real resources are spent on unproductive means
rather than being put back into the economy to continue to generate additional real
resources. These resources could be invested into additional capital accumulation, but
92
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are instead invested to obtain transfers that favor some and harm others. Intuitively, it
seems that the dissipation of these real resources should negatively impact the ability of
an economy to generate real output thus slowing standard of living growth. This chapter
provides additional state level evidence of this intuition regarding economic development
in the U.S.
Existing literature points out a few proxies for interest group activity. I have
included some existing proxies found in the last chapter, as well as a newly created state
index for lobbying activity. Four measures of economic development were used and I
found that interest groups do in fact have an overall negative impact on these measures of
well-being for U.S. states over the years 1990-2005. The following section provides the
theoretical motivation for the analysis. The third section includes a literature review of
both empirical growth models and of the interest group theory of government, as well as
a discussion of previously used measures of interest group activity. The fourth section
includes a discussion of the data and the empirical specification used, and the last two
sections discuss OLS regression results and conclusions.

II. Theoretical Motivation

This section presents a brief explanatory model of the relationship between
interest groups, the grantors of special interest legislation, and growth of real per capita
GDP. Interest groups, the demanders of special interest legislation, have two routes they
may take in order to get special favors from state governments: they can lobby for a bill
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passed through the legislature or they can lobby for a constitutional amendment in order
to obtain special privileges and/or government transfers.
Below a utility function is specified including things that may be important to the
group. The utility of a special interest group depends on the dollar amount in transfers
they are able to obtain (Tit) and the durability of these transfers (Dit). Transfers are a
function of the number of bills or amendments that are passed in their favor granting
special privilege, such as import quotas and protective tariffs, (BAit). An interest group i
at time t will maximize its expected discounted present utility, Uit. The budget constraint
on this utility function includes the costs of lobbying for legislation and constitutional
amendments as well as the costs of maintaining the group’s solidarity.

(1)

Uit = u (Tit, Dit)

Where,

(2)

Tit = f (BAit)

The durability of constitutional amendments at time t depends heavily on judicial
independence as found by Landes and Posner.

That is, they found that the more

independent the judiciary the more durable a constitutional amendment as judges tend to
interpret and apply amendments with the intent of the original enacting legislation.
Original intent is usually favorable to the interest group that helped form the amendment,
which means independent judiciaries help propagate this original intent and impart
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durability on the rents obtained through constitutional amendments. Factors like lifetime
appointments, rather than elections for limited terms, and guaranteed salaries affect the
degree of judicial independence. Obviously, a special government favor that is more
durable will be more expensive for the interest group to obtain, and constitutional
amendments are thought to be more durable than legislative bills94.
In supporting work by Anderson, et al., the question of why judges would behave
this way is answered. More durable legislation can be sold at a higher price (in the form
of campaign contributions, ect.), which benefits legislators. Because judiciary budgets
and salaries are determined by legislators, judges have an incentive to remain
independent and impart durability to legislative bills. They offer that judges behave in
the same wealth maximizing fashion as everyone else, so “there is no such thing as a free
judge.”95
Legislators are the suppliers of special interest legislation and they provide the
route through which an interest group must get a constitutional amendment or legislative
bill. A legislator will maximize the present discounted value of his utility function,

(3)

Lit = l (Git, Xit)

The above utility function was originally defined by Coates and Munger such
that a legislator’s utility depends on a vector of consumption goods (Git), which may
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include things like prestige, political influence and the feeling of performing a public
service. It also depends on a vector (Xit), which defines his tastes and preferences for
certain legislation. The legislator faces constraints such as constituency interests and
preferences, party and institutional pressures and electoral security. 96
Interest groups can play a large role in the re-election and party campaign
contributions for legislators, and are therefore a major part of their utility maximization
problem. Given the constraint that legislators want to remain in office, they must take
into account the special interests of voting groups. In supplying this legislation to interest
groups, legislators will also face some costs associated with procuring tax money from
other less organized groups.
Becker laid out a cost function for providing subsidies to pressure groups, where
subsidies are considered to be any political action that raises the income of the group.97
The cost function he defined had the following properties:
(4)

G (Rs) ≥ Rs,

Gʹ ≥ 1,

and Gʹʹ ≥ 0

Where, G is the cost of providing Rs, the subsidy per group member. This cost
per member includes any dead weight costs of distortions on recipient choices due to the
subsidy, which would make the subsidy cost to each member greater than the actual
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subsidy. He noted that if there are no distortions due to the use of lump sum taxes, then
G=Rs.98

Figure 4.1: The Market for Special Interest Legislation

Tollison explained that groups who bid for the protective shelter of the state are
those who have low costs of organization and they receive transfers taken from those
with high costs of organization. In other words, the demanders of legislation will be
comprised of groups that can organize for less than one dollar in order to obtain a dollars
worth of transfers. And, those groups for whom it would cost more than one dollar to
organize and avoid the loss of one dollar will make up the suppliers of those transfers.
Together, unorganized suppliers of transfers and organized demanders of transfers will
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form a market for legislation, as shown by Figure 4.1 on the previous page. Legislators,
as Tollison discussed, will monitor this supply and demand process by becoming a
middle man between suppliers and demanders. He notes that because legislators and
unorganized groups both make up the supply curve for legislation, the costs of organizing
will be reflected in the slope of the supply curve, while the position of the curve will
depend on how efficient legislators are at providing transfers to interest groups. 99
Barro’s neoclassical model of country growth is specified as,

Dy = f (y, y*)

Where, Dy is the growth rate of per capita output, y is the current level of per capita
output, and y* is the long-run or steady–state level of per capita output. The convergence
hypothesis states, in part, that the lower the starting level of per capita output, y, the
higher the growth rate of per capita output, Dy. The steady-state level, y*, depends on
private sector choice variables including savings rates, labor supply, fertility rates and
educational attainment, and on government choice variables such as tax rates, the extent
of market distortions, and spending. 100
Olson’s theories implied that countries which have seen large growth rates after being
defeated in war can attribute their growth convergence in part to the detachment of
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interest group power. In other words, countries experience a break down in political
structure and therefore interest group influence.101
The market for interest group legislation plays a major role in the expenditures of
government as well as the creation of market distortions, such as import quotas and
tariffs. In other words, the amount of legislation is decided by legislators, unorganized
tax payers and interest groups, given current political institutions and policies, and then
that legislation determines to a large degree the amount of government spending and
market distortions. This theoretical connection between interest groups, government and
development is the motivation for testing empirically the extent to which interest groups
affect the economic development of U.S. states.

III. Review of Literature

Growth Determinants Literature
Barro did a panel study across 114 countries using data from 1965-1990. The
major determinants of per capita growth rates for these countries according to this study
are current level of GDP, education, government consumption, fertility rates, democracy
and trade variables, and the inflation rate. Many of these variables should also be
important for explaining differences in development across states, although the
similarities among states should allow the omission of variables such as inflation,
democracy measures and trade variables. However, there are certainly differences in
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education and government consumption levels, therefore these should help explain
differences in the variation in development. As economic theory suggests, Barro found
that more human capital affects growth positively, and more government consumption
affects growth negatively.102
Charles Jones looked at the effect of ideas and research and development (R&D)
on the growth of the U.S. as a whole. Some important variables included in his analysis
were human capital, the labor force, the capital-labor ratio and annual change in years of
schooling along with proxies for his R&D variables of interest. Those R&D variables
included number of researchers, multifactor productivity and the share of labor in R&D
as well as the change in the share of labor in R&D. The first three variables are included
in most growth models and Jones found the coefficients to be positive and significant.
Although his estimates were for the entire U.S. across time, the growth rate of the U.S. is
compromised of the growth rates of individual states. Therefore, these components
should also be important to individual state growth and development.103
Frank Hanna looked at state per capita income components from 1919-1951. He
argued that U.S. state per capita income is determined by per capita wages and salaries,
per capita proprietors’ incomes, property incomes, and government transfer payments.
He finds no relationship between per capita proprietors’ incomes and per capita income,
but attributes the lack of relationship to the time period of interest as most proprietors
from 1919-1951 were farmers with little income. He found a significantly positive
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relationship between state per capita incomes and the other estimated coefficients. He
explained the positive relationship between transfer payments and per capita income by
the fact that transfer payments, such as unemployment and social security payments, are
typically based on previous salaries. So, states with higher per capita incomes generally
give out higher transfer payments.104
Mitchener and McLean follow the work of Easterlin105, but rather than looking at
crude state per capita incomes, they adjusted for differences in standards of living across
states. They determined price-adjusted per capita incomes by dividing each by the
consumer price index. Among other typically used independent variables, they find
positive relationships between price-adjusted per capita income and both the labor force
participation rate and estimated labor productivity.106
Edward Denison noted that it is important to figure out how to get economic
growth closer to its potential before we can truly reap the full benefits of eliminating
policies that protect certain groups at the expense of total output. He explained U.S.
economic growth from 1929-1957 by increased education, labor force, capital and
knowledge. His work suggested many ways in which this stable, democratic society can
increase the efficiency with which its economy works.
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removing barriers to international trade, obstacles imposed by labor unions and wasteful
tax spending on “little-wanted” farm products.107
Dougherty and Jorgenson departed from traditional growth accounting fashioned
in the seminal work done by Solow108 and Kuznets109, and determined quality-constant
measures of capital and labor inputs. The work done by Dougherty and Jorgenson
revealed that these are highly important sources of growth for industrialized countries.
These quality-constant measures account not only for substitution between capital and
labor inputs, but also substitution between different types of capital and different types of
labor as inputs.110

Interest Group Theory of Government Literature
Olson first laid out the implication that special interest groups reduce the
efficiency and aggregate income of a society, while at the same time making political
structure more factious. He argued that interest groups merely redistribute income rather
than create it, which reduces social efficiency and output. This reduced output would
stem from the society holding on to old technologies and being less responsive to
changing conditions, which slows economic growth. He provided evidence of these
implications for U.S. states by showing that membership in special interest organizations
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was negatively related to the growth of states from World War II through the 1970s. He
provided similar evidence for Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain.111
Nardinelli, Wallace and Warner used the length of time of political stability for
each U.S. state as a proxy for the number of interest groups. The political age of a state is
defined as the number of years since the last major political upheaval. When using this
proxy for interest groups the authors find that interest groups do not have a negative
impact on the income measure for U.S. states. They conclude that differences in income
measures are explained primarily by the starting levels of income, which falls in line with
income convergence theory.112
If legislation imparts some transfer from less organized groups to more organized
groups, as theorized by McCormick and Tollison, there will be a cost to obtaining this
legislation. They showed that this cost entails gaining the favor of the majority in both
the house and the senate; therefore, more legislation will be passed where the cost of
obtaining it is lower. Given that there are diminishing returns to obtaining votes within
each house, they argue that it is easier to obtain votes if the house and senate are more
evenly divided in their numbers of seats. They find that the more total seats within the
legislature and the larger the ratio of house seats to senate seats, the more bills and
occupational regulation enacted across states.113
Anderson, et al. specified a model of constitutional change using the interest
group theory of government. They showed that the one government instrument thought
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to be above the reach of interest group activity, the state constitution, is actually a vehicle
for it. Those interest groups who are able to secure a constitutional amendment in their
favor may expend more resources than for a legislative bill, but the legislative route lacks
the durability of a constitutional amendment. Durable wealth transfers by interest groups
are measured by the length of state constitutions in words. They provided evidence to
show that independent judiciaries do indeed help to impart durability onto constitutional
amendments. They also noted that former members of the Confederacy have tended to
completely scrap their constitution and rewrite it, which leaves room for interest groups
to capture durable constitutional wealth transfers. 114
Persson and Tabellini noted that constitutional change and design entails a
tradeoff between accountability and representation. The easier it is to replace incumbent
government and make them more accountable, the more likely it is that interest groups
will be represented rather than the actual representative population. They state that
“…this greater accountability also raises the propensity to target benefits to narrow
constituencies at the expense of broad spending programs.” 115
In their cross-country study, they find constitutions that use the plurality rule as
opposed to proportional representation actually enforce more accountability and result in
smaller rent consumption from interest groups, as well as less political corruption.
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Therefore, the structure of a constitution can actually promote more constitutional level
interest group activity and should also be an important factor in whether more rents are
disposed into the interest group “black hole.”

While they use the structure of

constitutions as the dependent variable in this analysis, their results are important to this
study in that they show evidence that constitutions are indeed a route for special
interests.117
Becker’s theoretical model of competition among interest groups addressed
Posner’s concerns of the public good characteristics in obtaining favorable legislation for
a special interest group with many members.118 Becker’s first corollary showed that it is
not the absolute efficiency in preventing free-riding among members, but the relative
efficiency of prevention to other industries. But, he also argued that pressure groups are
likely to be smaller than the groups that supply the taxes for their subsidies.119 So, there
are obviously free-riding problems with large groups which increase the costs of
organizing; however, these unorganized groups will provide subsidies for smaller, more
organized groups who are effective at controlling member free riding.

IV. Empirical Specification and Description of Data

Based on previous studies and on the theoretical motivation described earlier, I
have formulated an empirical specification to test if there are effects on state economic
117

Persson and Tabellini, “Constitutions and Economic Policy,” 74.-98.
Richard A. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science 5, no. 2 (1974): 335-358.
119
Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, no. 3 (1983): 371-400.
118

75

development from rent-seeking by interest groups. I have measured state economic
development using four different variables: state per capita income, number of new
housing units built, the value of those new housing units, and the number of initial public
offerings (IPOs). The model I used specified economic development as a function of the
following:

Economic development = f (pop, incperprop, incperworker, k/l, tax, pctworking,
bachelors, trans, length, year, ratio, size, lobbyscore)

development = Four measures used: state per capita income, new housing units,
value of new housing units, initial public offerings (IPOs)
pop

= state population,

incperprop

= income per proprietor,

incperworker = income per worker,
k/l

= the state capital-labor ratio,

pctworking

= percent of the population that is in the workforce,

bachelors

= persons aged 25 and up with a bachelors degree,

trans

= dollar amount of state transfer payments,

length

= length in words of the state constitution,

year

= year of the most recently ratified state constitution;

ratio

= ratio of house seats to senate seats in state legislature,

size

= size of state legislature,
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lobbyscore

= an index based on the degree of required state lobbying
disclosure that is higher if more disclosure is required.

Summary statistics are provided in Table 4.1 of Appendix C.

To explore

alternative measures of economic development, I used four dependent variable measures.
I first used a general measure of well-being: per capita income. But, per capita income
does not tell us everything about the economic development of a state, so I also used the
number of IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) per year in each state. On the control of new
entrants into industries, Stigler commented that, “…regulatory policy will often be so
fashioned as to retard the growth of new firms.”120 IPO data were obtained from the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR filing reports and are currently not
available prior to 1994.121 These data represent the number of firms that have filed S-1
forms, which is the initial form that must be submitted in order to begin offering public
stock in a company. If more companies are going public, then conditions must be
favorable for economic development.
In addition to IPOs, the number of permits for new housing units is also used to
measure the degree of economic development in a state. If conditions are favorable for
development in a particular state there will be more migration by workers and businesses
to that state, necessitating more housing. These are raw numbers of residential housing
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units authorized by building permits and the data were obtained from the U.S. Census
Bureau.122
To account for the possible differences in value of housing versus just new
housing units, I have also used the average value of new, privately owned housing units
per state. These data were also collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. States with more
highly valued housing are assumed to be more economically developed than states with
lower housing values.123 I also expect more interest group activity to affect housing
values negatively if these values accurately represent economic development.

The

following is a discussion of those explanatory variables used for each measure of
economic development.
Similar to the Hanna study, I have controlled for the income earned per proprietor
and the income earned per worker within each state.124 This should also adequately
capture the effects of differences in per capita income across states when looking at the
other measures of economic development.

Population is also controlled for when

explaining housing values, units and IPOs.
Like the Jones study, the capital-labor ratio is included since access to more
technology and capital investment should have a positive effect on development.125
Because the actual levels were not available, the capital-labor ratio has been measured for
this study as the ratio of payments made to capital and payments made to labor. To proxy
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human capital, I have included the percent of those 25 years and over that have a
bachelor’s degree. Similar to Mitchener and McLean, the percentage of population in the
workforce is included to account for the labor force participation of each state.126 Data
on the percent of the population in the workforce was not reported for the years 20012002, so I have omitted this variable in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for the sake of lost
observations.
Several proxies for interest group activity are used, all of which were important
factors in determining interest groups across states in the previous chapter. I chose this
method, rather than using trade associations to measure interest group activity, because it
allowed me to measure several routes of activity rather than the sheer existence of
groups. Just because groups exist does not mean they are active in rent seeking lobbying
activity; however, empirical work was done including trade associations as the only
measure of interest group activity in the specification discussed in Section IV of this
chapter. The existence of these associations was negatively related to all measures of
development when accounting for state and year fixed effects. The coefficient was
highly significant when using per capita income as the dependent variable, but
insignificant for the other measures of development.127
To capture interest group activity at the constitutional level, I have controlled for
both the length of state constitutions in words and the year of the most recently ratified
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When using per capita income as the dependent variable, the ln(number of trade boards) had a
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constitution for each state. According to the Anderson, et al. study mentioned previously,
rewriting a state constitution leaves room for special interest groups to lobby for durable
protection to go in the newly ratified constitution.128 States with longer constitutions are
likely to have catered to more special interests as added provisions will require additional
legalese within the document. So, if length is indeed a good proxy for constitutional
interest group transfers, the coefficient should be negative if this type of rent seeking
limits economic development.
A couple of effects could be picked up when controlling for the date of
ratification. First, if interest groups accumulate over time, then more recently written
state constitutions would be subject to additional demanders of constitutional provisions
than those state constitutions written in earlier periods. Second, there is a tendency in the
data that states with more recently ratified constitutions are also generally the same states
that have ratified more than one constitution over time. When a state has scrapped and
re-written a constitution, there is room for both the eradication of out-dated constitutional
transfers and the opportunity for groups to lobby for transfers to be added to the new
constitution. It will be up to the data to reveal the sign on this coefficient.
To proxy legislative level interest group activity, I have included the dollar
amount of transfers by state and a state lobby score of the degree to which lobbying
groups are held accountable by the government. Dollar amount of transfer payments may
measure interest group activity to some degree since many groups compete for transfers
from government. If more groups are competing, it implies that the price of getting those
128
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payments will be higher and a higher quantity of transfers will be supplied. However, if
the amount of transfers is fixed by state budget, only the price of getting them will
increase.
As explained by Hanna states with higher per capita incomes tend to give out
higher transfer payments since many payments are based on previously earned income.129
Therefore, I expect that transfer payments will be positively related to per capita income,
but negatively related to other measures of economic development.130 The state lobby
score is an index computed by the Center for Public Integrity.

Since states have

extremely varied laws regarding lobbyists and interest groups, this index is based on a
series of 48 questions regarding such things as how a lobbyist is defined and when they
must register, how often lobbyists must report gifts and how much they are allowed to
give without reporting.131
A high state lobby score implies that the state has strict laws regarding lobbying
activity, and therefore it is more costly to lobby in those states. The Center for Public
Integrity views scores of 70 and higher as relatively satisfactory. Scores of 60 to 69 are
considered marginal. Scores below 60 are considered failing.

Only one state,

Washington, scored above an 80. I expect that this score will be positively related to
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measures of economic development as an increased cost of lobbying will discourage rentseeking activity.132
I have also included the ratio of house seats to senate seats and the sizes of state
legislatures in the spirit of McCormick and Tollison. Their research showed that more
legislation is passed when the costs of obtaining a majority vote are smaller. They also
found that less legislation is passed the more evenly divided the seats across the house
and senate; therefore, we should expect less interest group activity for those states with
lower house-to-senate ratios.133

In addition, the previous chapter found a positive

relationship between interest group prevalence and the size of state legislatures. Because
groups feel they have better access to legislators and may be able to exploit that to their
advantage, we should also see less development where state legislatures are smaller.
State level panel data were used to estimate the above model using each of the
four dependent variables. All variables with the exception of bachelors, length, year,
ratio, size and lobby scores were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 134
The percent of state population with a bachelor’s degree was obtained from the National
Center for Educational Statistics,

135

and data on length, year, ratio and size were
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obtained from the Book of the States.136 Lobby scores were obtained from the Center for
Public Integrity.137

V. Estimation Results

The OLS regression results using each of the four dependent variables are
provided in Tables 4.2-4.5 of Appendix C. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 omit the percentage
working population as an explanatory variable in the interest of retaining observations.
This explanatory variable is included in the results in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Looking at the results using per capita income as the dependent variable, income
per worker, educational attainment and the capital-labor ratio are all positively related to
per capita income at the 5% or better significance level. The coefficient on income per
proprietor is unexpectedly negative and significant when fixed effects are taken into
account. The unexpected sign may be due to the high correlation between income per
proprietor and income per worker.138
The coefficients on the variables of interest seem to reveal that interest group
activity has a significantly negative impact on per capita income within U.S. states.
Longer state constitutions and more government transfers have a negative impact on per
capita income. Also, states that give out more transfers, have larger legislatures and
disproportionate house-to-senate seats tend to have lower per capita incomes.
136
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In

addition, the more recently a state has ratified its constitution, the lower its per capita
income. The only unexpected coefficient was that on lobby score. Higher lobby scores
indicate greater transparency in lobbying activities; therefore, lobbying should be costlier
in states with higher lobby scores leading to less lobbying activity.

A possible

explanation for this negative coefficient on lobby scores is that many businesses may
choose not to locate themselves in a state where they will have a difficult time obtaining
government favor.

If laws are too strict regarding lobbying activity, then big business

may keep clear of those areas.
When using new housing units and the value of those units as measures for
economic development it is obvious that population, income per proprietor, income per
worker and the capital-labor ratio have positive impacts. Surprisingly, the coefficient on
education is negative. A possible explanation for this is that new housing units show up
in those areas which are still developing and need a great deal of construction work done.
In order to develop the area, workers must come in to aid in the construction of new
buildings and homes. Typically the workers that perform this manual labor are not
required to have a great deal of education, so it may be the case that new construction
occurs when the population has a lower average education.
The constitutional variables of interest tell a similar story when using housing as a
measure of development. The longer the state constitution and the more recently it was
ratified, the fewer and less valuable new housing a state has. The lobby score coefficient
also tells the same story from the per capita income analysis in that the coefficient is still
negative suggesting that more transparency in lobbying activities may keep developers
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out since they will have more trouble obtaining government favor. It seems that allowing
states to have different policies on lobbying transparency would in turn cause some
businesses to choose to develop in those less transparent states.
The coefficients on the legislative variables of interest are very different from
those results found in the per capita income analysis. The coefficients for house-tosenate ratio and the size of legislatures are negatively related to housing development
when fixed effects are not accounted for; however, they become positive when fixed
effects are accounted for. The same is true for the coefficient on state transfer payments.
The inconsistency in these results may suggest that housing entrepreneurs may already
have stakes placed in state legislatures such that they get government favors and are able
to keep the competition out because of the high price of legislation.
To further investigate the effects of interest group activity on development, the
number of initial public offerings (IPOs) was also used to proxy economic development.
The results using this measure continue to suggest that lobbying activity is negatively
related to growth.

Lobby score still has a negative coefficient as does the size of

legislatures. All other coefficients were insignificant with the exception of population
and education; however, house-to-senate ratio and year of ratification each have negative
coefficients. Contrary to prediction, transfers and length of constitution tend to have
positive coefficients. But, if you can get more transfer payments, you may be more likely
to headquarter in that state.
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VI. Conclusion

The analysis provided in this chapter does provide evidence here that interest
groups stifle development. What is assumed in this study is that political institutions
influence the amount of interest group activity, then interest groups influence policy, and
finally policy influences development.

But, it is not clear that this is a one-way

causation. An increasing amount of work has begun in the area of political economy to
decipher exactly how differences arise in policies and economic outcomes across
countries. Possibly a more accurate assumption in this study is that more interest group
activity will occur where the cost of the activity is lower. Interest group activity is not a
simple task to measure, so the variables of interest have measured where the costs of
those activities are higher.
Although these results do not shed light on how preferences over economic and
political outcomes are aggregated and then translated into institutions and policies, they
do provide information on important correlations between economic outcomes and
political institutions. In addition, the measures of development used in this chapter may
not completely account for overall state development, but they do provide information on
three aspects of important development: standard of living, business and housing.
Another underlying assumption in this chapter is that all interest groups produce
economically damaging policies. Obviously there are interest groups who, in some
instances, seek to rid state economies of stringent business regulation and taxes simply
for their own benefit. But, for any economic “good” an interest group might do, there are
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always real resources spent and there is always more legislation sought to offer additional
protection and favor.

Interest groups were once seen as a positive step toward an

efficient political system.139 Yet much research has been done to counter this line of
thinking and support Olson’s school of thought.140 He theorized that for any good
interest groups could do for an economy, the harm done through wasting resources and
obtaining transfers had a much larger impact.
For example, environmental interest groups have played a major role in helping to
establish property rights for common access resources such as fisheries. Well-defined
and enforced property rights have long been associated with higher levels of income.
However, they have also helped to produce such policies as CAFE141 standards for
automobiles as well as immense funding for ethanol producers.142
Whether the outcome of our political system is deemed efficient or not, the
pressure from an organized few on the unorganized many seems to be a serious flaw of
democracy. Changes in the way people react to the incentives set before them are close
to impossible on an aggregate level. In other words, we cannot simply tell people to
behave differently. People and groups react optimally to the rules of the game, so there is
no need to blame interest groups, politicians or voters for the economic outcome of a
political structure. In order to see a change for the better, we cannot hope to sway
139
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preferences; we can only hope to change the rules of the game with the incentives of
players in mind in order to see changes in how our economy works. Seemingly the best
way to see political changes come to fruition is through much research and education.
Future work on this topic will explore alternative ways to measure economic
development and interest group activity. It is important to understand how interest
groups relate to economic outcomes in order to further understand how to translate
preferences over economic and political outcomes into institutions and policies. Critics
of this theory, such as Unger and van Waarden, have argued that interest groups do not
rise over time or as an economy becomes more politically stable. They argue that interest
groups merge and out-compete each other in the long run, leaving fewer, more powerful
interest groups.143 To account for their criticism, data are being collected on the assets of
interest groups to further explain economic development. This should shed some light on
the question of whether more monetarily powerful groups have an impact on economic
development.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the preceding chapters. First, private
markets for education create positive externalities on the educational quality received by
public school students. The presence of competition between these two substitutable
educational goods promotes more efficient behavior from public schools, which increases
the performance of public school students. But, public schools must first realize they are
losing the competition before they can take measures to provide a better quality education
to those students remaining in public schools. These measures will also take time to
conduct, all of which will delay a recognizable improvement in student performance.
It is widely held that because public institutions have different incentives than
private firms, their reactions to the same change in environment will either be delayed or
completely different from that of private firms.

Previous studies have ignored this

general difference in reactions from public institutions and have focused only on the
immediate effects on public school performance when faced with greater competition
from private schools. Obviously education is an important political issue and voters are
likely to eventually get rid of elected officials that generate outcomes in educational
quality that are not up to par with voter expectations.
So, there is eventual improvement in public school performance when private
schools begin to take over the market for education. According to the results provided in
Chapter II, the measurable improvement could take anywhere from 5, 10 or even 20 years
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to show up. While this may seem like an incredibly long lag, it follows the thought that
public establishments are differently motivated than private ones. Another important
implication of these results is the positive effect private markets have on the decisions
made by public officials which are important to economic development.
Second, differences in interest group formation depend on population differences,
socioeconomic development, differences in the structure of legislature, government and
industry, and public funds spending. According to the results provided, more highly
populated states have more interest groups. There is also an implication in this result that
the cost of regulation per person decreases for Congress as population increases.
Higher per capita income appears to be associated with fewer interest groups, as
hypothesized in the introduction. The structure of legislature is important to interest
groups in that larger senate majority sizes make it more costly for interest groups to
obtain legislation. Also, more legislative committees make it more difficult for interest
groups to gain a significant influence in legislation and the price of legislation is higher
where the ratio of house members to senate members is higher. Larger legislative sizes
generate more interest groups, which may indicate that more representatives increase a
group’s chance of being considered a serious constituent of an elected representative.
Additional government structure was measured by the length of state constitutions
and the dollar amount of state transfer payments.

Longer state constitutions are

associated with fewer interest groups, potentially indicating that durable constitutional
transfers obtained by incumbent groups are keeping other competing groups from
entering the market for constitutional government favor. More transfer payments tend to
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generate more groups lined up for handouts. Highly concentrated industry tends to result
in fewer total groups and most likely a few very influential groups.
Third, the factors that foster interest group formation are associated with less
economic development. As discussed in the introductory chapter, my results indicate that
interest groups do indeed create an overall negative impact on the development of
income, business and housing within the U.S. states. States where interest group activity
is prevalent tend to have lower per capita incomes, fewer businesses that invest in going
public in the stock market, and fewer and less valuable houses being built.
With the recent U.S. federal government policy of dolling out transfers to financial
institutions and the automotive industry, just to name a few, it should be clear that this
kind of favor shown to the few over the many is not likely the solution to our recent
economic downfall. Specifically, many organized groups will see this as an opportunity
to get in on the action of obtaining government handouts. As my results suggest, more
state transfer payments are a hindrance to economic development, reasoning which
almost surely translates in a similar fashion when it comes federal transfer payments.
Also, rather than allowing inefficient businesses to move out of the role of
production, we have again created the precedent of allowing pressure from once powerful
industries to dictate the direction of our economy. As economic growth studies have
shown, investments in education, capital and technology are some of the most important
factors for keeping our economy strong. As my results suggest investment in gaining
government favor and wealth transfers are draining to our economy. This conclusion
alone is perhaps most relevant in this study regarding our current economic situation.
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Appendix A
Chapter II Results

Table 2.2: Summary Statistics County-level Variables
Variable
(Observations = 399)

Standard
Deviation

Mean

Min

Max

API Test Score
Average School-level
Enrollment
Parental Education
Full Teaching Credentials
Percent on State-provided
Meal Plan

688.64

60.88

316.33

831.49

386.25
2.84
93.17

138.6
0.35
6.32

57.57
1.33
42.8

754.24
3.86
100

41.53

14.23

4.71

78.04

Percent African American
Percent American Indian
Percent Asian
Percent Filipino
Percent Hispanic
Percent Pacific Islander
Percent Middle Schools
Percent High Schools
Population Homogeneity
(Herfindahl Index)
Percent Private Enrollment
(current)
Percent Catholic

4.08
2.64
5.37
1.62
29.45
0.49
16
21

4.58
3.19
6.84
2.17
19.29
0.48
5
10

0
0
0
0
3.1
0
0
0

20.25
16.59
43.7
10.18
86.59
3.35
33
60

4056.92

1360.48

534.43

8202.8

9
23

12
11

0
5

96
62

1990 Private Enrollment

8502.97

25087.78

3

185714

1980 Private Enrollment

8805.28

26939.06

0

200050

129.29

235.18

2

1836

1087612

14200000

11.56

231000000

Total Public Schools
Variance of Public
Enrollment

Notes: “percent middle schools,” “percent high schools,””percent private”and“percent Catholic,” are multiplied by
100 to show the percentage terms, but were not multiplied by 100 when used as explanatory variables.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics School-level Variables
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

School Average Test Score
Total School Enrollment
School Avg. Parental Education
School Average Teacher Quality

51302
51302
51296
51301

684.88
541.34
2.74
89.51

122.53
455.67
0.77
13.52

231
11
0
0

999
4125
5
100

Percent of Students on Meal Plan

51302

48.91

30.61

0

100

Percent African American
Percent American Indian
Percent Asian
Percent Filipino
Percent Hispanic
Percent Pacific Islander

51302
51302
51302
51302
51302
51302

8.12
1.16
7.79
2.34
40.57
0.63

12.26
3.57
11.87
4.57
28.62
1.20

0
0
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
77
100
25

Table 2.4: OLS Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable
(Observations = 51295)
Total School Enrollment
Parental Education (school average)

Test Score
Coefficient Std. Error
**0.024 ( 0.003)
**0.061 ( 0.001)

Teacher quality (school average)

**0.001

Percent on meal plan
Percent African American
Percent American Indian
Percent Asian
Percent Filipino
Percent Hispanic
Percent Pacific Islander
Enrollment * Middle Dummy
Enrollment * High Dummy
Middle School Dummy
High School Dummy

**-0.002
**-0.002
**-0.003
**0.001
**0.001
**-0.002
**-0.002
**0.078
**-0.026
**-0.276
**-0.043

Constant

**6.308

Year Fixed Effects

( 0.000)
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.004)
0.004)
0.004)
0.003)

( 0.008)

yes

R2

0.73

Notes: **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%; Robust Standard Errors reported; Total enrollment,
Enrollment*Middle and Enrollment *High scaled by 1000; school-level data; log-linear specification
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimation Results Using Residuals as the Dependent Variable
(School-level Data)
OLS (log-log)
OLS (log-log)
Dependent Variable
Residuals
Residuals
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Private Enrollment 1990
**0.012 ( 0.004)
0.005 ( 0.004)
Private Enrollment 1980
**0.008 ( 0.002)
Percent Private (current)
**-0.004 ( 0.002)
**-0.004 ( 0.002)
Number of Public Schools
**-0.027 ( 0.007)
**-0.027 ( 0.007)
Variance of Public Enrollment
*-0.003 ( 0.002)
*-0.003 ( 0.002)
Population Homogeneity
0.003 ( 0.014)
0.003 ( 0.014)
Constant
0.028 ( 0.111)
0.023 ( 0.112)
County Fixed Effects
yes
yes
Year Fixed Effects
in orig. eq.
in orig. eq.
R2
0.60
0.60
Observations
391
391
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%; Standard Errors clustered by county; Residuals are from the
Specification in Table 1.4; County averaged data

Table 2.6: IV Estimation Results Using Residuals as the Dependent Variable

Dependent Variable
Private Enrollment 1990
Private Enrollment 1980

IV (log-log)
Residuals
Coefficient Std. Error

IV (log-log)
Residuals
Coefficient Std. Error

**0.009

(

0.004)

0.002
**0.007

(
(

0.004)
0.002)

Percent Private (current)
0.001
Number of Public Schools
**-0.024
Variance of Public Enrollment
-0.002
Population Homogeneity
0.002
Constant
0.049
County Fixed Effects
yes
Year Fixed Effects
in orig. eq.
R2
Observations

(
(
(
(
(

0.001)
0.007)
0.002)
0.014)
0.109)

0.001
**-0.025
-0.002
0.002
0.043
yes
in orig. eq.

(
(
(
(
(

0.001)
0.007)
0.002)
0.014)
0.110)

0.59
391

0.59
391

Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%; Standard Errors clustered by county; Residuals are from the
Specification in Table 1.4; County averaged data
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Table 2.7: Comparison of School-level and County-level Coefficients (OLS log-log)
County Average Test
Score

Dependent Variable
† Variable used in county average
model/Variable used in school-level
model

Private Enrollment 1990
Private Enrollment 1980
Percent Private (current)
Average Public
Enrollment/Total Enrollment†
Number of Public Schools
Variance of Pub. Enroll
Parental Education
Teacher Quality
Percent Meals
Population Homogeneity
African American
American Indian
Asian
Filipino
Hispanic
Pacific Islander
Percent of total schools
Middle/Middle Dummy†
Percent of total schools
High/High Dummy†
Average Enrollment*(Percent
Middle/Middle Dummy) †
Average Enrollment*(Percent
High/High Dummy)†
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

School-level test
score/Residual

Coefficient
Std. Error Coefficient
Std. Error
*0.043 ( 0.022)
0.005 ( 0.004)
**0.030 ( 0.014)
**0.008 ( 0.002)
0.028 ( 0.254)
**-0.004 ( 0.002)
-0.011
-0.034
**-0.013
**0.085
**0.008
0.001
-0.023
**-0.015
**-0.011
**-0.010
-0.002
**0.006
0.002

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.048)
0.033)
0.005)
0.036)
0.001)
0.001)
0.022)
0.006)
0.004)
0.003)
0.011)
0.002)
0.018)

**0.024
**-0.027
*-0.003
**0.061
**0.001
**-0.002
0.003
**-0.002
**-0.003
**0.001
**0.001
**-0.002
**-0.002

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.003)
0.007)
0.002)
0.001)
0.000)
0.000)
0.014)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)
0.000)

-0.122

(

0.086)

**-0.276

(

0.004)

0.029

(

0.061)

**-0.043

(

0.003)

0.018

(

0.021)

**0.078

(

0.004)

-0.010

(

0.024)

**-0.026
yes
yes

(

0.004)

yes
yes

Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%
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Table 2.8: Comparison of Private Enrollment Coefficients (OLS log-log)
Dependent Variable
Test Score
Residuals
Without 1980
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Private Enrollment 1990
**0.071 ( 0.027)
**0.012 ( 0.004)
Percent Private (current)
0.028 ( 0.025)
**-0.004 ( 0.002)
Dependent Variable
Test Score
Residuals
With 1980
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Private Enrollment 1990
*0.043 ( 0.022)
0.005 ( 0.004)
Private Enrollment 1980
**0.030 ( 0.014)
**0.008 ( 0.002)
Percent Private (current)
0.028 ( 0.254)
**-0.004 ( 0.002)
Notes: **significant at 1%; *significant at 5%; Percent Private scaled by 100
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable
(County-level data)
OLS (log-log)
Dependent Variable
Private Enrollment 1990
Private Enrollment 1980
Percent Private (current)

Test Score
Coefficient
Std. Error
**0.071 ( 0.027)

OLS (log-log)
Test Score
Coefficient
Std. Error
*0.043 ( 0.022)
**0.030 ( 0.014)
0.028 ( 0.254)

0.028

(

0.025)

-0.011

(

0.048)

-0.011

(

0.048)

-0.034
**-0.013
**0.085
**0.008
0.001
-0.023
**-0.015
**-0.011
**-0.010
-0.002
**0.006

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.033)
0.005)
0.036)
0.001)
0.001)
0.022)
0.006)
0.004)
0.003)
0.011)
0.002)

-0.034
**-0.013
**0.085
**0.008
0.001
-0.023
**-0.015
**-0.011
**-0.010
-0.002
**0.006

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.033)
0.005)
0.036)
0.001)
0.001)
0.022)
0.006)
0.004)
0.003)
0.011)
0.002)

Pacific Islander
0.002
Percent of total schools
Middle
-0.122
Percent of total schools
High
0.029
Average
Enrollment*Percent Middle
0.018
Average
Enrollment*Percent High
-0.010
Constant
**5.715
County Fixed Effects
yes
Year Fixed Effects
yes
2
R
0.95

(

0.018)

0.002

(

0.018)

(

0.086)

-0.122

(

0.086)

(

0.061)

0.029

(

0.061)

(

0.021)

0.018

(

0.021)

(
(

0.024)
0.346)

-0.010
**5.693

(
(

0.024)
0.344)

Average Public Enrollment
Number of Public Schools
Variance of Pub. Enroll
Parental Education
Teacher Quality
Percent Meals
Population Homogeneity
African American
American Indian
Asian
Filipino
Hispanic

Observations

yes
yes
0.95

379

379

Notes: ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%; Percent private (current), Average Enrollment*Pct M and Average
Enrollment*Pct H are scaled by 100; white race omitted; robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.10: IV Estimation Results using ln (API) as the Dependent Variable
(County averaged data)
IV (log-log)
Dependent Variable
Private Enrollment 1990
Private Enrollment 1980
Percent Private (current)

IV (log-log)

Test Score
Test Score
Std. Error
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient
0.086 ( 0.104)
0.077 ( 0.106)
0.009 ( 0.018)
-0.072 ( 0.109)
-0.072 ( 0.109)

Average Public Enrollment

-0.041

(

0.099)

-0.041

(

0.099)

-0.107
*-0.017
*0.150
**0.008
0.004
-0.019
0.004
*-0.011
-0.005
*-0.018
*0.010

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.132)
0.010)
0.076)
0.004)
0.004)
0.024)
0.008)
0.006)
0.005)
0.009)
0.005)

-0.106
*-0.017
*0.150
**0.008
0.004
-0.019
0.004
*-0.011
-0.005
*-0.018
*0.010

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

0.132)
0.010)
0.076)
0.004)
0.004)
0.024)
0.008)
0.006)
0.005)
0.009)
0.005)

0.032

(

0.041)

0.032

(

0.041)

-0.021

(

0.186)

-0.021

(

0.186)

Percent of total schools High

0.277

(

0.371)

0.277

(

0.371)

Average Enrollment*Percent Middle

0.003

(

0.057)

0.003

(

0.057)

-0.017
**5.184

(
(

0.027)
1.196)

-0.017
**5.177

(
(

0.027)
1.192)

Number of Public Schools
Variance of Pub. Enroll
Parental Education
Teacher Quality
Percent Meals
Population Homogeneity
African American
American Indian
Asian
Filipino
Hispanic
Pacific Islander
Percent of total schools Middle

Average Enrollment*Percent High
Constant
County Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
R2
Observations

yes
yes

yes
yes
0.73

0.73

379

379

Notes: ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%; Percent private (current), Average Enrollment*Pct M and Average
Enrollment*Pct H are scaled by 100; white race omitted; robust standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.11: Coefficients on Lags of Private Enrollment

OLS
Lag Length on Private
School Enrollment

Obs

County and Year
Fixed Effects

Coefficient

(t-1)
(t-2)
(t-3)
(t-4)

309
259
207
154

no
no
no
no

-0.43
-0.12
-0.02
0.08

0.31
0.23
0.21
0.20

no
no
no
no

(t-1)
(t-2)
(t-3)
(t-4)

309
259
207
154

yes
yes
yes
yes

-0.06
-0.03
1.32
0.53

0.23
0.17
1.23
1.76

no
no
no
no

Std. Error

Significant

Notes: All coefficients scaled by 100; none were significant at the 10% or better confidence level; ln (API) as the
dependent variable; regression results included 1980 private enrollment
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Appendix B
Chapter III Results

Figure 3.1: The Calculation Methods Used for Herfindahl Industry Concentration:


Using Number of Firms in Each Industry:
HHI= (S12 + S22 + S32 + …..+ SN2) * 10,000
Where, Si = (firms in industry i) / (total firms in all industries)



Using Annual Payroll of Each Industry:
HHI = (T12 + T22 + T32 + …..+TN2) * 10,000
Where, Ti = (Annual payroll in industry i) / (Annual payroll in all industries)
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Interest Group Formation Variables
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Number of Trade Associations
Trade Associations Per Capita
Population
Per Capita Income
Senate Committees
Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate
(equals 1 if Senate majority is Republican,
0 otherwise)
Length of State Constitution (in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers in Dollars (1000s)
Size of Legislature
HHI Firms (using number of firms in
industry)
HHI Payroll (using amount of payroll in
each industry)

800
784
784
800
800
784

123.89
27.5
5518372
25304.80
15.41
70.11

162.65
1
1374
18.8
0.45
107
5996467 453690 36200000
5836.95 13164
45318
6.32
4
39
36.86
20
282

784
725
784
800
784

0.95
31526.13
2.95
3583.01
150.26

0.23
36001.50
2.14
968.80
58.01

0
6600
1.53
1632
60

1
340136
16.67
8020
424

400

921.80

31.01

838.57

1005.41

400

964.82

139.37

746.55

1499.25

Notes: “Trade associations per capita” is scaled by 1000000 in the above table
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Max

Table 3.2: OLS Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent
Variable without Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations)

OLS (log-log)
Coefficient

OLS (log-log)

Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error

Population

**0.758

0.024

**0.781

0.026

Per Capita Income

**0.840

0.117

**1.431

0.125

Number of Senate Committees

**-0.196

0.032

**-0.277

0.054

Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)

**-0.545

0.121

**-1.052

0.158

0.03

0.056

**0.175

0.071

Length of State Constitution (in words)

**-0.062

0.027

-0.014

0.035

0.0459

0.057

0.08

0.084

State Transfers

**0.403

0.099

**1.382

0.111

Size of State Legislature

**0.480

0.140

**0.940

0.182

**-0.452

0.115

**-14.581

1.721

**-32.919

1.110

House-to-Senate Ratio

Industry Payroll Heterogeneity
Constant
County Fixed Effects

no

no

Year Fixed Effects

no

no

R2

0.88

0.79

Observations

352

709

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.3: IV Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent
Variable without Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations)

IV (log-log)
Std.
Coefficient
Error

IV (log-log)
Std.
Coefficient Error

Population

**0.759

0.026

**0.794

0.029

Per Capita Income

**0.741

0.172

**2.096

0.168

Number of Senate Committees

**-0.205

0.035

**-0.244

0.058

Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)

**-0.596

0.137

**-0.982

0.173

0.041

0.057

**0.162

0.074

Length of State Constitution (in words)

**-0.063

0.031

-0.004

0.387

0.061

0.065

-0.014

0.091

State Transfers

**0.472

0.122

**1.040

0.123

Size of State Legislature

**0.527

0.158

**0.947

0.202

**-0.490

0.129

**-13.883

2.233

**-37.478

1.400

House-to-Senate Ratio

Industry Payroll Heterogeneity
Constant
County Fixed Effects

no

no

Year Fixed Effects

no

no

R2

0.88

0.78

Observations

303

657

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%

103

Table 3.4: OLS Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent
Variable with Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations)

OLS (log-log)
Coefficient
Std. Error

Population
Per Capita Income
Number of Senate Committees
Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution
(in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers
Size of State Legislature
Industry Payroll Heterogeneity
Constant

OLS (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error

**0.502

0.176

0.197

0.201

**-0.099

0.036

**-0.194

0.091

0.014

0.020

-0.034

0.082

-0.040

0.044

-0.039

0.094

0.006

0.012

-0.067

0.053

0.023

0.033

-0.066

0.063

**-0.276

0.081

*-0.544

0.303

*0.185

0.111

*0.461

0.255

**0.391

0.088

0.503

0.376

-0.021

0.122

**-5.552

2.741

-3.782

4.583

County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

Year Fixed Effects

yes

yes

R2

100

0.98

Observations

352

709

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.5: IV Results Using ln (Number of Trade Associations) as the Dependent
Variable with Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations)

IV (log-log)
Coefficient

Population

IV (log-log)

Std. Error

Coefficient Std. Error

**0.500

0.204

-0.069

0.394

-0.170

0.141

-1.528

1.441

0.018

0.029

0.017

0.136

-0.035

0.051

-0.097

0.141

0.002

0.013

-0.030

0.070

0.015

0.035

-0.111

0.076

**-0.225

0.088

-0.279

0.483

0.411

0.315

-0.366

1.231

**0.322

0.104

0.325

0.545

Industry Payroll Heterogeneity

-0.003

0.126

Constant

-6.483

5.114

20.787

28.944

Per Capita Income
Number of Senate Committees
Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution
(in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers
Size of State Legislature

County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

Year Fixed Effects

yes

yes

R2

100

0.97

Observations

303

657

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.6: OLS Results Using ln (Natural log of Trade Associations Per Capita) as
the Dependent Variable without Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations Per Capita)

OLS (log-log)
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Per Capita Income

OLS (log-log)
Std.
Coefficient Error

**0.759

0.118

**1.463

0.123

**-0.283

0.031

**-0.352

0.054

-0.152

0.145

**-0.666

0.155

0.023

0.069

**0.176

0.078

**-0.197

0.026

**-0.152

0.030

*0.143

0.076

0.145

0.091

**0.449

0.105

**1.366

0.109

Size of State Legislature

-0.256

0.147

0.249

0.166

Industry Payroll Heterogeneity

-0.225

0.142

**-15.807

2.080

**-33.057

1.134

Number of Senate Committees
Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control (1=yes,
0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution (in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers

Constant
County Fixed Effects

no

no

Year Fixed Effects

no

no

R2

0.42

0.60

Observations

352

709

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.7: IV Results Using ln (Natural log of Trade Associations Per Capita) as the
Dependent Variable without Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: ln(Trade
Associations Per Capita)

IV (log-log)
Coefficient
Std. Error

Per Capita Income

IV (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error

**1.000

0.189

**2.101

0.165

**-0.280

0.034

**-0.316

0.059

-0.171

0.162

**-0.619

0.166

0.019

0.073

**0.162

0.080

**-0.186

0.028

**-0.131

0.034

0.126

0.087

0.051

0.097

**0.420

0.133

**1.034

0.124

Size of State Legislature

-0.227

0.164

0.292

0.181

Industry Payroll Heterogeneity

-0.159

0.161

**-18.654

2.715

**-37.395

1.407

Number of Senate Committees
Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control (1=yes,
0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution
(in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers

Constant
County Fixed Effects

no

no

Year Fixed Effects

no

no

R2

0.41

0.58

Observations

303

657

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.8: OLS Results Using ln (Trade Associations Per Capita) as the Dependent
Variable with Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable:
ln(Trade Associations Per
Capita)
Per Capita Income
Number of Senate
Committees

OLS (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error
**-0.088

0.038

*-0.163

0.095

0.014

0.020

-0.026

0.080

-0.062

0.046

-0.041

0.095

0.005

0.014

-0.071

0.053

0.012

2.980

*-0.107

0.064

**-0.280

0.082

*-0.554

0.331

*0.225

0.115

**0.698

0.248

**0.393

0.088

0.478

0.424

-0.013

0.126

**-13.293

1.436

**-17.497

3.129

Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution
(in words)
House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers
Size of State Legislature
Industry Payroll
Heterogeneity
Constant

OLS (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error

County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

Year Fixed Effects

yes

yes

R2

0.99

0.96

Observations

352

709

Notes: The coefficient on Length of State Constitution including the HHI measure was scaled by 100; **
significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Table 3.9: OLS Results Using ln (Trade Associations Per Capita) as the Dependent
Variable with Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable:
ln(Trade Associations Per
Capita)

IV (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error

IV (log-log)
Coefficient Std. Error

Per Capita Income
Number of Senate
Committees

-0.161

0.146

-2.026

1.904

0.025

0.028

0.063

0.161

Senate Majority Size
Republican Senate Control
(1=yes, 0=otherwise)
Length of State Constitution
(in words)

-0.055

0.053

-0.119

0.167

0.001

0.015

-0.017

0.083

-0.007

0.031

*-0.174

0.093

**-0.244

0.088

-0.203

0.593

0.481

0.309

-0.254

1.431

**0.340

0.106

0.227

0.698

0.010

0.129

**-14.631

3.920

9.601

30.806

House-to-Senate Ratio
State Transfers
Size of State Legislature
Industry Payroll
Heterogeneity
Constant
County Fixed Effects

yes

yes

Year Fixed Effects

yes

yes

R2

0.41

0.58

Observations

303

657

Notes: ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%
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Appendix C
Chapter IV Results

Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Interest Groups and Economic Development
Standard
Deviation

Variable

Obs

Mean

Min

Max

Per Capita Income
Housing Units
Housing Unit Value
IPOs
Population
Income Per Proprietor
Income Per Worker
House-to-Senate Ratio
Size of Legislature
Capital-Labor Ratio
Working Population
Percent with Bachelor's Degree
Dollar Amount of Transfer
Payments
Latest Constitution Year
Length of State Constitution
(in words)
Lobby Score

800
750
800
650
800
800
800
784
784
800
700
800

25304.80
29399.24
3378358
28.40
5423855
19.76
27.33
0.40
150.26
0.33
0.51
23.67

5836.95
34052.18
4732455
113.64
5947771
6.25
6.69
0.11
58.01
0.06
0.03
4.83

13164
631
61584
0
453401
1
14.01
0.06
60
-0.08
0.42
12.30

45318
255893
46800000
1094
36100000
42.65
49.98
0.66
424
0.61
0.58
37.40

800
800

3583.01
1894.78

968.80
50.23

1632
1780

8020
1983

725
800

31526.13
58.40

36001.50
13.47

6600
0

340136
87

Notes: All Data range from 1990-2005, with the exception of IPOs, Housing Units, Working population and
Length. IPOs are not available prior to 1994 and Housing Units only available through 2004. Working population
data are currently missing for the years 2001-2002 and there are some missing values for Length.
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Table 4.2: OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development
Dependent
Variable:

Per Capita Income
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Population
Income Per
Proprietor
Income Per
Worker
Percent with
Bachelor's Degree
Capital-Labor
Ratio
Length of State
Constitution
(in words)
Dollar Amount of
Transfer Payments
State Constitution
Year
House-to-Senate
Ratio
Size of State
Legislature
Lobby Score
Constant
2

Housing Value
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Housing Units
Std.
Coefficient
Error

IPOs
Coefficient

Std.
Error

**1.107

0.033

**1.073

0.036

**0.945

0.120

-0.004

0.011

**0.290

0.031

**0.229

0.029

-0.117

0.111

**0.375

0.043

**1.213

0.223

**1.025

0.244

0.413

0.738

**0.186

0.033

0.198

0.167

*-0.318

0.181

**2.339

0.612

**0.198

0.031

0.202

0.153

*0.317

0.168

0.614

0.459

**-0.016

0.006

**-0.114

0.027

**-0.088

0.027

0.057

0.105

*-0.045

0.024

-0.205

0.126

**-0.684

0.133

0.003

0.455

**-0.549

0.188

**-1.899

0.816

-1.103

0.832

-0.857

2.436

**-0.066

0.019

-0.011

0.062

-0.006

0.061

-0.158

0.224

*-0.035

0.020

**-0.424

0.093

**-0.296

0.096

**-0.924

0.401

**-0.160

0.030

**-0.256

0.112

-0.021

0.119

**-0.802

0.362

**8.900

1.447

**12.804

6.223

7.267

6.347

-6.688

18.346

R

0.46

0.86

0.85

0.39

Observations

693

693

646

367

Notes: State and year fixed effects are not accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a log-log
function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%; *significant at
10%
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development
with State and Year Fixed Effects
Dependent
Variable:

Per Capita Income
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Population
Income Per
Proprietor
Income Per
Worker
Percent with
Bachelor's
Degree
Capital-Labor
Ratio
Length of
State
Constitution
(in words)
Dollar Amount
of Transfer
Payments
House-toSenate Ratio
Size of State
Legislature

Housing Value
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Housing Units
Std.
Coefficient
Error

IPOs
Coefficient

Std.
Error

**0.879

0.168

**0.893

0.215

-0.629

1.930

**-0.096

0.038

-0.007

0.065

0.08

0.077

0.368

0.499

*0.230

0.123

**1.255

0.365

**0.965

0.431

-2.120

1.996

0.216

0.146

**-0.605

0.274

**-0.617

0.309

1.229

1.961

-0.044

0.093

0.217

0.170

0.18

0.237

-1.155

1.461

-0.020

0.028

*-0.088

0.046

**-0.126

0.054

-0.004

0.358

**-0.435

0.101

*0.376

0.203

0.15

0.255

-1.948

2.562

-0.181

0.143

**0.644

0.262

**0.655

0.265

-0.704

1.927

-0.173

0.194

**0.685

0.315

**0.851

0.372

-1.292

2.547

Lobby Score

**-0.660

0.218

-1.308

1.133

**-3.288

1.484

(dropped)

Constant

**10.662

1.156

-0.878

4.735

4.639

3.666

31.875

2

R

0.73

0.99

0.98

0.78

Observations

693

693

646

367

42.957

Notes: Both state and year fixed effects are accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a log-log
function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%; *significant at
10%
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development
(Including Working Population)

Dependent
Variable:

Per Capita Income
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Population
Income Per
Proprietor
Income Per
Worker
Percent with
Bachelor's
Degree
CapitalLabor Ratio
Working
Population
Length of
State
Constitution
(in words)
Dollar
Amount of
State
Transfer
Payments
Year of State
Constitution
House-toSenate Ratio
Size of State
Legislature

Housing Value
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Housing Units
Std.
Coefficient
Error

IPOs
Coefficient

Std.
Error

**1.115

0.035

**1.087

0.037

**0.979

0.135

-0.001

0.012

**0.283

0.033

**0.213

0.031

-0.083

0.130

**0.362

0.046

**0.995

0.250

**0.645

0.265

0.241

0.839

**0.222

0.040

0.047

0.162

**-0.491

0.174

**2.470

0.647

**0.217

0.034

0.014

0.181

0.03

0.196

0.533

0.506

**-0.314

0.137

**2.070

0.559

**2.887

0.549

2.184

1.867

**-0.026

0.007

*-0.059

0.031

-0.02

0.030

0.149

0.125

*-0.053

0.028

-0.011

0.140

**-0.403

0.147

0.311

0.534

**-0.763

0.232

-0.468

0.948

0.90

0.954

-0.817

2.863

**-0.070

0.021

-0.032

0.067

-0.047

0.068

-0.178

0.244

*-0.039

0.023

**-0.493

0.100

**-0.412

0.101

**-0.984

0.450

Lobby Score

**-0.194

0.033

-0.166

0.119

0.092

0.127

*-0.658

0.365

Constant

**10.561

1.772

2.097

7.205

-7.513

7.274

-9.786

21.604

2

R

0.43

0.86

0.86

0.43

Observations

617

617

570

312

Notes: “Working Population” was not included in Tables 4.2and 4.3 in the interest of lost observations as 2001-2002
data were not reported; State and year fixed effects are not accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent
a log-log function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%;
*significant at 10%
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression Results Using Various Measures of Development
with State and Year Fixed Effects (Including Working Population)

Dependent
Variable:

Per Capita Income
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Population
Income Per
Proprietor
Income Per
Worker
Percent with
Bachelor's
Degree
CapitalLabor Ratio
Working
Population
Length of
State
Constitution
(in words)
Dollar
Amount of
State
Transfer
Payments
House-toSenate Ratio
Size of State
Legislature
Lobby Score
Constant

Housing Value
Std.
Coefficient
Error

Housing Units
Std.
Coefficient
Error

IPOs
Coefficient

Std.
Error

**1.201

0.176

**1.172

0.230

-1.122

2.317

**-0.090

0.042

-0.018

0.066

0.09

0.084

0.521

0.566

0.176

0.140

**1.740

0.366

**1.461

0.430

-0.996

2.122

0.208

0.175

**-0.774

0.311

**-0.890

0.362

1.526

1.989

0.048

0.103

0.237

0.169

0.22

0.238

-2.085

1.485

**-0.457

0.225

**3.134

0.398

**3.211

0.489

-0.678

4.496

*-0.046

0.027

-0.017

0.052

-0.06

0.057

0.075

0.428

**-0.411

0.114

**0.521

0.205

0.33

0.259

-3.655

2.808

-0.212

0.137

**0.970

0.208

**1.063

0.223

-1.859

2.892

-0.254

0.186

**1.043

0.234

**1.323

0.292

-2.953

4.215

-0.232

0.405

-1.077

0.981

**-5.599

1.494

(dropped)

**9.382

2.092

**-8.603

2.269

*7.096

3.892

51.807

R2

0.76

0.98

0.98

0.79

Observations

617

617

570

312

48.637

Notes: “Working Population” was not included in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in the interest of lost observations as 2001-2002
data were not reported; State and year fixed effects are accounted for in the above table; the coefficients represent a
log-log function and should be interpreted as elasticities; robust standard errors reported; **significant at 5%;
*significant at 10%
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